Measuring the Commitment to Reduce Hunger: The Hunger Reduction Commitment Index

Final report Phase 1

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Introduction

> *Addressing hunger...ultimately is a matter of political priorities..at a global level there is no independent body which audits the implementation of these commitments. Neither is there an independent authority with the power and willingness to name and shame those who have lived up to their promises*
>
> (Hunger Task Force 2008, p.23)

The Hunger Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) initiative takes this statement from the Hunger Task Force as its starting point. Can an index be constructed to assess the commitment to reduce hunger and will it achieve anything positive?

Why did the Hunger Task Force call for a way of assessing commitments? First, levels of hunger remain scandalously high, hovering around one billion. Given levels of aggregate prosperity, unprecedented access to technology, information and know-how, this is a travesty. But we need to know where to support efforts and to apply pressure to incentivise change. Second, a "crisis" only seems to be declared when there is the threat of an upward trend from a base of around 800-900 million, the pre 2008 food price spike levels. Clearly a crisis existed before 2008 as indicated in Figure 1. We need other mechanisms to rally around.

Figure 1: Number of Undernourished People in the World, 1969-71 to 2010

Source: FAO; Note: Figures for 2009 and 2010 are estimated by FAO with input from the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Rsearch service. Full details of the methodology are provided in the technical background notes at www.fao.org/publications

Third, the measurement of outcomes alone is not a sufficiently strong accountability mechanism, largely because attribution is difficult (there are many factors contributing to hunger reduction, many of which Governments cannot control) and because of a lack of transparency (we don't actually know what Governments are doing to address the situation.   When the outcomes trend positively Governments can claim credit (perhaps falsely) and when they trend badly, Governments get the blame (perhaps unfairly). We need to be able to track a Government's commitment.

What does the measurement of commitment result in? How will it change anything? The theory of change behind the existence of the HRCI is that (a) the HCRI will measure commitment credibly and this will strengthen our ability to hold Governments and donors to account for their

efforts in reducing hunger, (b) if civil society is better able to hold Governments and donors to account in terms of their effort to reduce hunger, then it can apply pressure and ensure that hunger is not neglected and keep it higher on the development agenda, (c) Governments and donors can hold themselves to account in their efforts to keep hunger high on the agenda. Such an index can help them to track and prioritise their efforts because the index is constructed on the basis of performance in different areas (legal, policy and expenditure), (d) commitment can be linked to outcomes, to allow all to assess the 'value added' of different commitments and efforts and (e) vitally, the process of assessing commitment can be a way of building awareness and commitment of civil society and Governments to reduce hunger.

Are there precedents for the construction of such an index? At the macro level, the Center for Global Development, in Washington, constructs an annual "commitment to development" index for donor countries which assesses their commitments to development across performance in a range of sectors (aid, trade, migration, environment, investment, support for the creation and dissemination of next technologies, and security).[1] This index is widely used by ONE.org and other organisations to mobilise support for development in the host countries. At the more micro level Freedom House's Freedom in the World[2] indicators of the extent to which civil and political freedoms are respected, protected and fulfilled are widely used to pressure and support Governments throughout the world to be more open, inclusive and equitable.

In terms of hunger, the closest indicator to the HRCI is Action Aid's Hunger Free Scorecard (Action Aid 2009; Action Aid 2010), which combines hunger outcomes with hunger expenditures and other indicators of commitment. This conflation of outcomes and commitment is problematic because Governments do not have total control over outcomes. In addition, we believe more insight is generated into commitment if commitment per se is set against levels and progress in outcomes.

The other key index in the hunger area is the Global Hunger Index [3]from IFPRI, Concern International and German AgroAction. It combines FAO's hunger indicator (see Figure 1), the percent of the population below an "undernourishment" index (based on food supply) with the percent of children under 5 that have low weight for age and under five mortality rates. It has quickly become an influential indicator, being cited in many places. The two advantages it has over the FAO indicator are (a) it is a more rounded assessment of hunger (not just being based on food production and trade) and (b) crucially, the second and third components can be disaggregated at the sub-national level, which brings a wide range of political, regional and ethnic factors into the analysis of hunger. Nevertheless, it remains an outcome indicator, one that Governments cannot control.

Conceptualising political commitment

How then to conceptualise commitment in a way that facilitates its measurement? The literature highlights that 'political will' is frequently equated with 'political commitment' and so we use these terms interchangeably. Both concepts are characterised by vagueness and little analytic content, yet routinely used in a catch all manner (Thomas and Grindle 1990, p.1164), often applying a *post hoc* circular logic (Brinkerhoff 2000). Indeed, for some, political will is the "slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon" (Hammergren 1998, p.12). We were unable to identify analytical

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1 http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424561
2 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=594
3 http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2010-global-hunger-index

efforts that measured or systematically compared political commitment/will across or within countries, or between state and non-state actors.

Building on Brinkerhoff (2000), political commitment can be broken down into components of action and intention. Intention is driven by ownership and capacity because political commitment has a latent quality. Even in the absence of action, there may be a residual element of intention, which may not necessarily be visible or tangible. For instance, decision makers' assessments of their capacity to implement new policies, and their assessment of the strength of opposition to it will influence their a priori willingness to make commitments (Morrissey and Verschoor 2006), in: (Brinkerhoff 2007)). Thus, "if capability is limited and opposition relatively strong, however, governments may not wish to declare their intent-they may be committed, but will not wish to risk failure by declaring ownership" (Morrissey 1995, p.640).

The difficulty of identifying and measuring actual intention leads us to focus analysis on elements of action. We thus only consider the **actions** of governments[4] in their pursuit of hunger reduction. One way of thinking about this is to consider what governments say, what they do, and what they do not do (The Policy Project 2000) . Public statements by political or bureaucratic leaders suggest a level of volition, but statements without consequent concrete action may be merely symbolic.[5] Actions of particular interest concern sustained material, legal and financial efforts(The Policy Project 2000).

Consequently, the HRCI identifies three themes under which government action is compared across a selected group of developed countries and developing countries:

* Policies and programmes
* Legal frameworks
* Public expenditures

For each theme, we identify several indicators for which secondary (existing) data can be used to measure political commitment (see Methodology section).

Relying solely on secondary data to assess commitment has limitations. First, we do not really know what is happening on the ground. Countries can improve their index rankings by merely committing to policies, programmes and laws on paper, while failing to implement them. Second, the secondary data may not vary significantly from year to year. This is certainly true for the legal framework indicators and possibly also for the policy variables. This will result in country rankings that are not terribly dynamic. Third, while the between country rankings will be important for some advocacy and accountability activities, each country will have different set of country –specific resources to underpin commitment and it is important to track these. Finally, the collection of the data itself has the potential to be an important advocacy tool in its own right, raising consciousness and initiating dialogues. The exclusive use of existing data to construct the indices means that this opportunity is lost.

Accordingly we have designed an instrument to capture primary data related to commitment, an instrument that can be adapted to each country's circumstances. The primary data helps to triangulate findings from the secondary data collection exercise; are likely to be more sensitive to

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[4] For the purpose of building an index that compares across countries, this project focuses on national level governments. This aggregates political will at a high level, and is thus not suitable for identifying differences in commitment at a lower level of aggregation, e.g. across departments, or between levels of administration.
[5] This project further recognised that content analyses comparing statements by political leaders in media outlets could make a valuable contribution, but deemed this approach too resource intensive to be applied.

temporal changes; will help control for country circumstances, and the process of engagement with in country experts has potential to inspire networking and action to enhance political commitment to hunger reduction in a country. Initially we had hoped this would draw both on "expert" knowledge from those professionally engaged in the policy process in each country and on another set of "experts" from communities. Due to resource and time limitations we were only fully able to execute our plans for the professional experts, although we do some community work and suggest how it may be more formally incorporated into future index work. Appendix 1 provides several examples of what community voices may sound like.

The next section of the report sets out theoretical and methodological considerations for building an index. It is followed by a discussion of the specific choices made in constructing the HRCI, with reference to the secondary and primary data collection exercises.

Methodological considerations for building an index

The previous section clarified the key concept that the HRCI aims to assess (commitment) and its operationalisation. Here, we review decisions to be made in the construction of the HRCI.

These concern the selection of indicators (the items composing the index); normalisation of selected indicators; aggregation of normalised indicators into the HRCI; the ranking of countries with the index; sensitivity analysis to test robustness of choices; and the predictive power of the index.

Selection of the items composing the index

An index is essentially an 'include-and-weight' function. Its construction involves decisions about what indicators to include and how to weight each. Indices need to be critically evaluated on the following aspects (Ravallion 2010):

- Conceptual clarity
- Transparency about tradeoffs within the index
- Robustness tests, openness on the quality of data and on the weights used
- A critical perspective on policy relevance

Conceptually, we do not include hunger outcomes in the HRCI. While the two are closely related-- commitment should drive hunger outcomes and outcomes should affect commitment-- there are many other factors that drive hunger. Nevertheless, when we present the HRCI rankings we contextualise the rankings by country specific hunger levels.[6]

Hunger and the commitment to fighting hunger are fuzzy concepts that can be approximated by several variables. We have used a theory-based approach to the selection of the index items, mindful of secondary data availability. We have chosen this approach rather than using data mining devices such as factor analysis, cluster analysis and fuzzy sets because the theory behind hunger measurement and commitment is sufficiently well developed to guide choices.

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[6] STATA datasets and syntax files are available on request.

As indicated in the previous section the HRCI incorporates three main themes (a) Legal frameworks, (b) Policies and programmes and (c) Public expenditures.
Each theme is composed of several indicators. The following general principles guide their selection:

1. Indicators should cover the major aspects of efforts to reduce hunger: food availability (production and market availability), food access (the ability to access and purchase food) and food utilisation (the ability to use food to build nutrition status)
2. Indicators should be simple and transparent in order to be easily understood by all stakeholders
3. Indicators within a theme should be highly correlated, but less strongly correlated with indicators in other themes (to ensure different dimensions of commitment are being captured).

Normalisation of items within a set

Once indicators have been selected they need to be normalised before being aggregated. Normalisation prevents an indicator from having greater weight in the determination of an index simply because of its unit of measurement. For example, adding infant mortality rate (absolutely low) and malnutrition rate (absolutely large) without normalising, as done by the Global Hunger Index of IFPRI, implicitly attributes higher weight to the items that is absolutely larger (assuming they have similar variances). The normalisation procedure we use is the one adopted by UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) and based on the following formula:

$$normalised\ value\ of\ x_i = \frac{x_i - x_{min}}{x_{max} - x_{min}}$$

This normalises the value of the indicator to a fraction of the range of the observed values in the data.

Aggregation of items within a set

Indicators within a set can be aggregated in very different ways.

Equal weights: This approach takes the average of the normalised values in a set. This is the approach the HRCI takes and is also the approach adopted by HDI. This approach corresponds to the balance across the 3 elements in each of our conceptual models (for hunger—availability, access and utilisation) and for commitment (legal framework, policies and spending). Moreover the approach is transparent and enables policymakers to focus additional policy efforts.

Subjective weights: Here, a group of experts determine which indicators are more important than others. Obviously, there is a large component of subjectivity in this exercise, depending on the experts, the time and the place. We have chosen to give the indicators equal weighting for now, but as the HRCI is developed it may become clear that another weighting scheme is more appropriate.

Data mining-Principal Components Analysis: Statistical devices can be used to identify the weighting scheme. Principal components analysis (PCA) for example has been widely used to build indices of 'wealth' or 'intelligence' (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Hunt 2007). PCA assigns weights to items based on their correlations in order to find the 'principal component' (the index)

which best represents the available data. This approach has the advantage of being 'objective' and avoiding value judgments, but is also atheoretical and nontransparent. Our sensitivity analyses explore all three methods to determine how sensitive our rankings are to weighting choices.

Ranking countries and the 3 themes

The overall HRCI ranking is derived from separate rankings for the 3 themes (legal framework, policies and programmes, government expenditures). We use a Borda ranking scheme to preserve the ordinal nature of the index. In other words, rather than ranking the values of the indicators across themes we rank the sum of the rankings across themes (Dasgupta 2001). Table 1 illustrates this.

Table 1: Hypothetical Cardinal and Borda ranking schemes compared

Country	Legal framework (a) (high score is better)	Policies and programmes (b) (high score is better)	Public expenditures (c) (high score is better)	Cardinal ranking (based on adding values of a,b and c) (1 is best)	Borda ranking (based on adding the rankings a, b and c) (1 is best)
India	0.6	0.5	0.9	1	2
China	0.3	0.6	0.5	3	3
Brazil	0.8	0.8	0.1	2	1

Sensitivity analysis

Sensitivity analysis is used to check the robustness of the index to choices about its components or construction. An index is robust if the rankings it generates do not vary substantively after small changes in composition or construction. We calculate the index in different ways and explore correlations between ranks. If the correlation between ranks (the Spearman rank) is high, then the index is said to be robust to the variation.[7] We used sensitivity analysis to assess the selection of variables, the normalisation method and the weighting scheme used.

Predictive power of the index

A good index should be able to predict (explain) phenomena within the theoretical framework of its construction. For example an index of hunger commitment should explain, after controlling for a series of confounding factors, achievements in hunger reduction. If the predictive power is poor then either commitment does not matter in hunger reduction—possible but unlikely--or we have a poor index. The only methodology available to statistically test the predictive power of the index on hunger outcomes is the use of cross-country regressions, although they have their limitations (Smith and Haddad 2000). Calculations of the index for past (and future) years will allow us to link it to hunger outcome data and test for the relevance of different commitment formulations. We aim to do this in future phases.

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[7] However, high Spearman correlations alone are not sufficient for robustness, as they can occur in conjunction with significant re-rankings (Ravallion 2010).

Building the HRCI using secondary and primary data

Building on ActionAid's HungerFREE Scorecard (Action Aid 2009; Action Aid 2010) the HRCI is constructed for donor (developed) and developing countries using secondary data. For developing countries, their commitment to reducing their own country's hunger is being assessed. For donor countries, their commitment to reducing hunger in the developing world is assessed. We also collect primary data to gain additional insights into commitment and to test out methodologies that will be used in future work to triangulate and supplement secondary data and support in country advocacy.

We apply the HRCI to the 29 countries included in the HungerFREE Scorecard which have a substantial hunger problem and the in-country presence of partner organisations to facilitate secondary and primary data collection and to 22 developed countries and OECD-DAC member states. The HRCI significantly differs from the HungerFREE Scorecard in terms of its removal of hunger outcomes from index calculation, and in its aspiration to use both secondary and primary data.

Figures 2 and 3 set out the basic structure of the HRCI effort for developing and developed countries.

For the 21 developing countries for which we have full secondary data the 3 themes each have 3 indicators (Figure2). Each theme is given equal weight in the HRCI and each indicator is given equal weight within each theme. In two developing countries we collect primary data from experts under 2 themes: policy and programmes, and expenditures.

Figure 2: The structure of the HRCI for developing countries

For the 22 developed countries for which we have secondary data the legal framework theme was less relevant (being confined to support for international rather than national frameworks) and was merged with the policies and programmes theme (Figure 3). The developed country HRCI thus comprises two themes that are equally weighted with 5 indicators each. For one developed country we collected primary data from experts under the policy and programme and expenditures themes.

Figure 3: The structure of the HRCI for developed countries

Primary data

For primary data the project designed an expert perceptions survey. The survey employed a structured questionnaire posing over thirty questions (plus additional sub-questions[8]) to a variety of 30-45 experts on hunger and malnutrition (see Table 2). The surveys were conducted from October 2010 – May 2011, to cover 42 experts in Bangladesh, 30 in Zambia and 26 in the UK. Respondents were identified by in-country partner organisations working on hunger and malnutrition issues, and aimed to cover a spread of experts from government, academia, private sector, international donors, and civil society organisations to avoid bias of any particular group and to ensure that divergent opinions are represented.[9]

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[8] Primary data was collected for unequal numbers of indicators and questions; each indicator/question does not carry equal weight.
[9] Prior to the survey, respondents were given a one page summary outlining the objectives, and setting out our procedure regarding confidentiality and anonymity:

• All information resulting from the discussion would be treated as confidential;
• Anonymisation procedures would be applied to ensure that findings cannot be traced to individual respondents;
• Interview findings would be combined with findings from interviews with fellow experts – accordingly, no interview data will be presented as standalone findings;
• At any moment, respondents have the right to withdraw co-operation or retract information given.

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Table 2: Summary of expert respondents

	Bangladesh	Zambia	United Kingdom
Mode	Face to face Interviews	Face to face interviews	Web-based (Survey Monkey)
Respondent type: - NGO/civil society - academia/research - government - international organisations - other	11 17 5 7 2	9 1 9 8 3	11 6 0 3 6
Number of respondents	42	30	26

The survey instrument employs five-point Likert scales, where respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreement with statements and questions, with low scores corresponding to high levels of government commitment to reduce hunger (1 = very strongly, 2 = strongly, 3 = moderately, 4 = weakly, 5 = very weakly). In Bangladesh, an initial test of the questionnaire was conducted for 6 respondents, following which the interviewing process and content were discussed by project partners, and minor modifications made to the instrument.

A slightly amended questionnaire was employed in a parallel survey of 26 experts on the UK aid effort aimed to address hunger. This survey employed a web-based module (using Survey Monkey). Experts were identified initially through the personal networks of research partners, sent a personal invitation from participant researchers, and followed up with a reminder email. Thirteen responses were generated in this way. Once responses were exhausted (and the response rates were moderate at 30%), a second round was organised contacting a wider group of respondents through existing IDS lists and communities, such as the Livelihoods Network, Eldis Communities and Twitter. This resulted in an additional 13 respondents for a total of 26.

Based on this survey, a number of commitment indicators were developed (cf. Brinkerhoff 2000):

- The institutionalisation of credible incentives for individuals in, and between, government agencies (e.g. is poor performance on hunger objectives sanctioned, and is success rewarded, with, say, promotions and extra resources?)
- Institutions coordinating policy (e.g. do the various ministries of agriculture, health, and social protection effectively coordinate?)
- Locus of policy origin (e.g. is the body in charge of implementing policies also the one that designed it, having strong ownership?)
- Learning and adaptation mechanisms and practices (e.g. regular monitoring and evaluation)
- The marshalling of scientific evidence in decision-making processes (e.g. is policy informed by new insights on how to address hunger?)
- Mobilisation of stakeholders (e.g. do government agencies actively aim to get widespread support for their interventions)
- Public commitment (are decision makers' policy preferences revealed, and resources assigned to achieve these open to public scrutiny?)
- Resource allocation and expenditures (e.g. what is the strength, relevance and sufficiency of expenditures on hunger reduction policies and programmes?)
- Continuity of effort (e.g. are efforts strong and sustained, or episodic, one-shot efforts?)
- Coherence of domestic policy with aid policy for hunger reduction (exclusive to developed countries)

For developing countries (Zambia, Bangladesh), the questions underpinning these indicators are summarised in (Table 3).

Table 3: Overview of questions in expert survey developing countries, by indicator

Indicator	Questions
Institutional coordination	Q26. As hunger and malnutrition is typically an issue of relevance to multiple ministries and governmental agencies, could you inform whether the government has appointed a coordinating body that promotes joined up thinking/action?[10] Q27. If yes, how successful is this body in delivering a coordinated approach to hunger and malnutrition reduction?
Government intention and action	Q2. In your opinion, what kind of a priority action does your government give to hunger and malnutrition? Q6A. For the key government policies you identified in question 5... How important does the government consider these? Q6B. For the key government policies you identified in question 5, how sufficient are current government efforts towards fulfilling policy goals? Q30. In your opinion, generally, how good is the implementation of public policies (re: hunger and malnutrition)?
Locus of initiative	Q5A. Could you name those policies that the government considers most relevant and currently undertakes to reduce hunger and malnutrition (name up to 5 - refer to those listed in table above)? For each, can you tell to what extent was this policy initiated by the agency responsible for executing it?
Analytical rigour	Q17. How important is scientific evidence in hunger and malnutrition policymaking processes in the country? Q18. How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and evidence (e.g. Monitoring & Evaluation; Research & Development) for policy?
Public commitment	Q16. How clearly are public policy preferences aiming to address hunger and malnutrition set out in government documents? Q21. How accessible is government policy (aiming to address hunger and malnutrition reduction) to public scrutiny (by citizens, civil society, media, etc)?
Learning and adaptation	Q19. In general, how likely are government policies to be adjusted (e.g. to objectives, instruments, strategies and funding) when strong evidence piles up that suggests a change of course? Q20. To what extent does the government innovate and experiment with new policy approaches developed domestically or abroad to combat hunger and malnutrition?
Mobilisation of stakeholders	Q7. In your opinion, how well do agencies[11] responsible for a) designing and b) implementing these policies build broad-based social and political support in order to ensure their success and longevity? Q10. In your opinion, how successful do agencies in charge of/implementing key policies muster adequate and ongoing support to overcome resistance from stakeholders whose interests are threatened? Q11. In your opinion, what levels of support do government efforts towards hunger reduction and malnutrition receive from a) the public; b) civil society; c) political opposition; d) the civil service; e)

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[10] This is the only question in the survey having a yes/no answer category. We attributed a value of 1 in case of yes, and 5 in case of no.
[11] Agencies designing policy refer to government bodies. The question on implementation can consider non-government bodies,

	international donors and f) the private sector?
Continuity of effort	Q31. In your opinion, to what extent does the government enhance a) administrative capacity and b) financial capacity at 1) national and 2) sub-national levels to effectively address hunger reduction and malnutrition in the country? Q32. In your opinion, to what extent does the government utilise existing a) administrative capacity and b) financial capacity at 1) national and 2) sub-national levels to effectively address hunger reduction and malnutrition in the country?
Credible incentives	Q28. For the government *agency/agencies* in charge of a) designing and b) implementing hunger and malnutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned (e.g. through budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas; gain/loss of respect, etc)? Q29. Similarly, for *individuals* within the government agencies in charge of a) designing and b) implementing hunger and malnutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned (e.g. through promotions, training opportunities; budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)?

For developed countries (UK), the questions underpinning these indicators are summarised in Table 4.

Table 4: Overview of questions in expert survey developed countries, by indicator

Indicator	Questions
Institutional coordination	Q34. Hunger and malnutrition is typically an issue of relevance to multiple donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral). What level of intellectual leadership does UK aid demonstrate in a) multilateral forums and b) within a recipient country, with other donors? Q35. What level of practical leadership does UK aid demonstrate in a) multilateral forums and b) bilaterally within recipient countries (e.g. by chairing donor coordinating bodies)?
government intention and action	Q7. What kind of a priority does the UK aid programme give to hunger and malnutrition? Q8. How does current attention to the theme of hunger and malnutrition in the UK aid programme compare to this one year ago? Q12. For those hunger and malnutrition reduction interventions identified as most important in UK aid, how sufficient are current efforts towards fulfilling policy goals? Q13. To what extent do UK aid officials speak out against hunger and malnutrition in: a) International public forums; b) Recipient country public forums and c) Recipient country private forums (with political, civil service and civil society leaders)
Locus of initiative	Q15. To what extent do DFID (UK Department for International Development) in-country offices enjoy flexibility to create hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes sensitive to country specific circumstances?
Analytical rigour	Q16. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and b) in-country offices have of the status of hunger and malnutrition in recipient countries? Q17. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and b) in- country offices have of causal factors of hunger and malnutrition? Q18. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and b) in-country offices have of potential solutions for hunger and malnutrition? Q19. How important is scientific evidence in UK aid programmes on hunger and malnutrition reduction? Q20. How developed are UK aid systems (e.g. Monitoring & Evaluation, Research and Development) for generating knowledge and evidence for policy?
Public commitment	Q26. How clearly are policy preferences aiming to address hunger and malnutrition (in the developing world) set out in UK government publications? Q27. How open is UK government policy (aiming to address hunger and malnutrition

	reduction) to public scrutiny (by citizens, civil society, media, etc)?
Learning and adaptation	Q21. In general, how likely are UK aid programmes and policies to be adjusted (e.g. to objectives, instruments, strategies and funding), when faced with strong evidence that suggests a change of course? Q22. To what extent does UK aid innovate and experiment with new policy approaches developed domestically or abroad to combat hunger and malnutrition? Q23. What level of importance do UK aid programmes give to informing and influencing hunger and malnutrition relevant policies in recipient countries?
mobilisation of stakeholders	Q24. How successfully do UK aid programmes muster adequate and ongoing support for its hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes in recipient countries? Q25. How would you evaluate UK government communication efforts towards domestic audiences to build and retain support for overseas hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes?
continuity of effort	Q33. Is the UK aid programme on hunger and malnutrition best characterised as: a) Entirely long term, programme oriented; b) Chiefly long term, programme oriented; c) Mixture of long and short term, programme and project; d) Chiefly short term, project focused; or e) Entirely short term, project focused
Credible incentives	Q31. For DFID as an agency, is the (lack of) achievement of hunger and malnutrition policy objectives credibly sanctioned or rewarded (eg through promotions, training opportunities, budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)? Q32. For DFID (individual) staff, is the (lack of) achievement of hunger and malnutrition policy objectives credibly sanctioned or rewarded (eg through promotions, training opportunities, budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)?
Coherence domestic policy – aid policy	Q36. To what extent do UK achievements to reduce CO_2 emissions and efforts mitigating climate change cohere with the objectives of UK aid towards hunger and malnutrition reduction overseas? Q37. To what extent do UK domestic agricultural subsidy policies cohere with UK aid policy objectives regarding hunger and malnutrition reduction in developing countries? Q38. To what extent does the UK position in international trade negotiations (or the position it takes to influence EU trade policy) cohere with UK aid policy objectives regarding hunger and malnutrition reduction?

The resources available restricted primary data collection to these 3 countries. We reflect later on what we learned from this data collection and how to combine primary and secondary data in the next version of the index.

Secondary data

Hunger and malnutrition are complex phenomena driven by amongst others social, biophysical, and political economic factors, each of which offer entry points for government intervention. Neither being prescriptive nor exhaustive, this version of the HRCI is a first attempt at identifying and justifying a range of indicators that can assess government commitment to reduce hunger.

This section will first discuss indicators used for the developing country HRCI, followed by indicators used for the developed country HRCI.

Developing countries HRCI: selected indicators

The indicators had to illuminate the following aspects of hunger and food insecurity:

- The availability of food in sufficient quantities and of sufficient quality
- People's access to food (e.g. through purchases or through leveraging of entitlements)
- The utilisation of food for nutrition and health

Because hunger is subject to multiple causalities there is a very large potential set of interventions for governments to make, e.g. on agriculture, social protection, health, women's empowerment, poverty reduction, etc. Indeed, our initial assessment soon included over 50 potential indicators. This set was reduced when we took into account the need to have the data available for a minimum set of 20 or so countries. We were also mindful of the quality of the data as reported by other analysts (Ravallion 2010) and whether there was sufficient variation in indicator scores across countries to be able to distinguish between countries.

The technical background report refers to the full set of indicators considered. Here, we report on the indicators selected for secondary and primary data collection.

The Table 5 below locates the secondary data indicators by dimension of food security and by sector.

Table 5: Nine secondary data indicators by dimension of food security, developing countries

	Food and Agriculture	Women's empowerment	Social protection	Health environment
Food Availability	Public expenditures on agriculture	Women's access to agricultural land		
Food Access	Implementation of FAO National Programme on Food Security	Public expenditure on education	Constitutional right to social security Constitutional protection of right to food	Civil registration of births
Food Utilization				Public expenditures on health

Note: The final indicator "The existence of a national hunger or nutrition strategy" covers all cells of table.

For the Legal Framework theme, the 3 indicators are:

Women's access to agricultural land

Women are vital players in the food system yet often lack equal legal status in respect of access to productive agricultural land. Even in cases where women have *de jure* equal status to men, this often does not translate into *de facto* equality. This enhances their vulnerability to hunger. As the recent FAO State of Food and Agriculture report 2010-11 notes, if women in rural areas had the same access to land, technology, financial services, education and markets as men, agricultural production could be increased and the number of hungry people reduced by 100-150 million (FAO 2011)*.* The data are derived from the OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index (OECD undated).

Constitutional right to social security

The constitutional right to social security should signal a clear willingness and strong legal duty for governments to protect their citizens from destitution, and attendant hunger. Our data are derived from (Vidar 2006; Knuth and Vidar 2011) and a manual update.

Level of constitutional protection of the right to food

The constitutional right to food should provide a very clear signal of government commitment to reduce hunger. This indicator recognises the various ways in which such a right may be more or less explicitly formally incorporated in the highest body of law. Data is derived from (Vidar 2006; Knuth and Vidar 2011) and a manual update.

For the Public Expenditures theme, the 3 selected indicators are:

Public expenditure on Health as % of total government expenditure

This indicator acknowledges the importance of a well financed public health system for the prevention of hunger and malnutrition. The WHO World Health Statistics 2010 (with data pertaining to 2007) provides the data.

Public expenditures on Agriculture as % total government expenditure

This indicator recognises that public investment in agricultural systems is critical for total food production, as for example promoted by the Global Fund for Food Security and Agriculture, and stated in the African Union's Maputo Declaration (2003), which aspires for member states to spend at least 10% of government budgets on agriculture. Data on this indicator is derived from IMF data (collated by Fan and Saurkar 2006; Fan, Omilola et al. 2009; Benin, Kennedy et al. 2010).

Public expenditure on Education as % GDP

This indicator recognises the central importance of education in people's ability to achieve higher economic productivity, help gain a livelihood, and achieve higher incomes to enhance their access to food. In the absence of data expressing education expenditures as a share of total government expenditure (for same years as on agriculture and health), we present this as a share of GDP. Data is collated from the World Bank - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?page=2 (accessed 25 August 2011).

The research looked for strong indicators on social protection spending, but failed to find reliable data for a wide enough range of countries.

For the Policies and Programmes theme, the following three indicators were selected:

Does a government have national hunger and/or nutrition policy or strategy?

The existence of national policies and strategies signals a government's recognition of hunger as a problem that needs addressing, and is often a basic prerequisite for further government action at lower levels of administration. Data on this indicator is derived from (Vidar 2006; Knuth and Vidar 2011) and has been updated by web based searches.

Implementation of FAO National Programme for Food Security

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations runs an extensive programme through which it assists a wide range of developing countries to start a national programme for food security. This indicator looks at the extent to which these are advancing towards implementation. Data on this indicator is collected from FAO (http://www.fao.org/righttofood/).

Civil registration of births (% population)

Public acknowledgement of an individual's existence from birth (to death) is vital for the effective realization of various legal and civil rights enshrined in constitutional declarations and socio-economic provisions granted by states (Szreter, 2007, p. 67-68). It enhances access to a range of government services, including health and social protection that can assist in combating hunger. Moreover, a case can be made that an identity registration system, in conjunction with collective social security provision, can be institutions of fundamental importance for the stimulation of economic growth, even in impoverished agrarian economies (Szreter, 2007, p.69). Data on this indicator are derived from the annually published World Health Statistics of the World Health Organisation.

Developed countries HRCI: selected indicators for secondary data collection

For developed countries the HRCI has two themes: a) Government Expenditures and b) Policies, programmes and legal framework. We considered a range of indicators, settling for 5 per theme. Indicators broadly considered whether countries engage in international collaboration that aims to address hunger and malnutrition, address climate change as reinforcing existing, and driving new vulnerabilities related to hunger, and provide financial assistance keeping in mind (a) ability to support (a country's Gross National Income as a share of the overall GNI of the group of countries), and (b) the size of the required support. In addition, indicators considered how countries' domestic policies (in relation to climate change and agricultural protection) cohere with pronounced policies aiming to address hunger in the developing world.

For the Government Expenditures theme:

ODA to Agriculture and Food Security as % of the fair share required in 2012 (% of US 28.4 bn per year needed)

This indicator follows the approach of the HungerFREE Scorecards of 2009 and 2010. The fair share refers to an assessment by FAO that an additional US $30 billion per year investment in agriculture and rural infrastructure, additional to emergency food aid is needed. It is assumed that developing countries will fund about a third of the increase needed, requiring donors to provide the shortfall of US$20 billion. Bilateral and multilateral donor spending in these areas has been about US$8.4 billion per year, so the total donor funding needed by 2012 is about US$28.4 billion per year. As with all the expenditure indicators, the quality of spend also matters and this is an issue to explore in the next round of index construction.

ODA to Social Protection as % of fair share of the maximum estimate of annual USD 52.4 bn required

Following the methodology of the HungerFREE Scorecard (Action Aid 2009), the benchmark figure is based on estimations of the cost of extending a 'minimum essential package' comprising community-based management of acute malnutrition, employment guarantee programmes, social pensions and child growth promotion, in order to globally eliminate seasonal

hunger and enhance food security throughout the year (Devereux, Vaitla et al. 2008). It estimates the costs as amounting to £48.52 billion (US$78.64 billion) annually. It further assumes that rich countries need to bear two-thirds of the financial burden. Consequently, developed countries need to collectively invest US$52.4 billion each year for social protection in developing countries.

ODA on Climate Change mitigation as a % of GNI

ODA on climate change mitigation is averaged for 2007 - 2009 gross disbursements (expressed in current USD millions) and assessed relative to a country's wealth. These data are based on the "Rio marker" on climate change mitigation, established by the DAC, which has been elaborated in collaboration with the UNFCCC-Secretariat. It focuses on climate change mitigation, with aid defined as comprising activities that contribute "to the objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration" (OECD 2009, p.1). For future index editions, it is recommended to include ODA spending on climate change adaptation (this data is currently unavailable, but has been assigned as a marker from 1 January 2010).

Fair share on nutrition (% of $10.3 bn p/a)

This indicator specifically recognises the importance of nutrition in gaining better hunger outcomes. Donor countries' ODA expenditures on nutrition are (generously) defined as comprising:

- Basic nutrition (purpose code 12240), classified as: Direct feeding programmes (maternal feeding, breastfeeding and weaning foods, child feeding, school feeding); determination of micro-nutrient deficiencies; provision of vitamin A, iodine, iron etc.; monitoring of nutritional status; nutrition and food hygiene education; household food security.
- Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation: Water supply and sanitation through low-cost technologies such as handpumps, spring catchment, gravity-fed systems, rain water collection, storage tanks, small distribution systems; latrines, small-bore sewers, on-site disposal (septic tanks).
- Education/training in drinking water supply and sanitation
- Infectious disease control (Immunisation; prevention and control of malaria, tuberculosis, diarrheal diseases, vector-borne diseases (e.g. river blindness and guinea worm), etc.) (OECD undated)

A fair share calculation is once more applied, making a conservative assessment for what is needed to scale up 13 priority nutrition interventions: US$11.8 billion per annum, of which US$ 1.5 billion is expected to be borne by private household resources. This leaves a total financing gap of US$ 10.3 billion to be raised from public resources (both national and global) to support the scale-up (High Level Taskforce on the Global Food Security Crisis 2010; Horton, Shekar et al. 2010).

The extent of financial support to UNFCCC via the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF) as a % of GNI

Under the UNFCCC, Parties have established three special funds: the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), both under the Convention; and the

Adaptation Fund (AF), under the Kyoto Protocol. These are the funds used to calculate 'finances to the UNFCCC' indicator, with data available at
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/graphs-statistics/deposits-by-country;
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/least-developed-countries-fund;
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/special-climate-change-fund

A country's financial support for these is compared its relative ability to contribute, expressed as a share of its Gross National Income.

For the Policies, Programmes and Legal Framework theme the selected indicators are:

Contributions to multilateral trust funds for food crisis – managed by WB (GAFSP/European Union's Food Security Facility/GFRP MDTF)

In the wake of the 2007/08 global food price crisis, several multilateral trust funds were set up to which countries were asked to contribute. The most important ones concern the World Bank launched Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP), which received firm pledges amounting to approximately $880 million (High Level Taskforce on the Global Food Security Crisis 2010). Russia and the EU have set up separate trust funds, also to be managed by the WB. This indicator asks whether countries contribute to these funds. Data is collected from the World Bank (World Bank 2010).

Total protection for domestic agricultural commodities

Many developed countries provide trade protection to domestic agricultural producers. Such agricultural subsidies and tariffs distort trade, and are unfair on farmers in developing countries who are not subsidised. Low levels of protection thus signify a commitment to strengthen production incentives for farmers in the developing world, to strengthen their economies, enhance incomes to purchase food, and to enhance production incentives and volumes. Data is derived from the Commitment to Development Index (Roodman 2010).

Biofuel blending targets

Domestic policies and laws in donor countries can perversely incentivize and mandate the use of biofuels driving the utilization of food and land for purposes detrimental to food security. For instance, this can happen through the conversion of food crops (e.g. maize) into fuel, or the displacement of arable land previously used for food production. Moreover, biofuels increase carbon emissions, when the effects of land use change are taken into account (Searchinger, Heimlich et al. 2008).

Climate change carbon emissions

Climate change induces higher variability in weather patterns and increases the occurrence of extreme weather events, therewith reinforcing existing vulnerabilities and introducing new ones, with significant potential and actual impacts on food insecurity and hunger. We employ the HungerFREE Scorecards methodology (Action Aid 2010). It considers countries' emissions in 2008 relative to what is needed for a 40 percent reduction of 1990 emissions. All calculations are done including emissions from Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). Because the EU burden-sharing levels are specified against 2005 emissions, emission targets for EU countries have been recalculated based on 1990 levels, and compared with actual emissions 2008. Specifically, using the same relative proportional reduction rates on 2005 levels

specified by the burden-sharing agreement, emission targets necessary for a total 40 percent reduction on 1990 levels were calculated (assuming that the effective EU-15 cuts on 1990 levels totaling 16 percent should be doubled to 32 percent under a total EU target cut of 40 percent on 1990 levels). This was then compared with actual 2008 rates. The calculation can be expressed as:

100 * {2008 emissions / (1990 emissions – [({ country burden sharing rate * 2005 country emissions } / total EU-15 reduction on 2005 emissions) * (0.68 * total EU-15 1990 emissions)]) }.

% of total ODA disbursements with a gender policy objective

This indicator highlights the extent to which donor countries incorporate gender equity concerns in their policies. Gender equity is a desirable policy objective for many reasons. In relation to hunger, it breaks down prevalent barriers for women's equal access to productive land and its produce and facilitates higher productivity in agriculture. ODA data is derived from the OECD Query Wizard for International Development Statistics: http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/

Findings

This chapter presents HRCI rankings for developed and developing countries. Each section will present index rankings based on secondary data, and present selected findings from primary data collection.

HRCI for Developing Countries

Table 6 shows the country rankings by theme and overall commitment using the secondary data.

Table 6: The HRCI for developing countries: overall and theme rankings (1 is best)

Country	Rank legal framework	Rank government expenditures	Rank Policies and programmes	HRCI (1 is best)
Malawi	2	4	4	**1**
Guatemala	2	15	2	**2**
Brazil	1	18	1	**3**
Senegal	14	2	7	**4**
Ethiopia	2	3	19	**5**
Tanzania	9	1	14	**5**
Ghana	9	7	9	**7**
Gambia	2	12	12	**8**
Uganda	2	17	10	**9**
Rwanda	20	6	3	**9**
Burundi	14	9	6	**9**
Nigeria	2	19	8	**9**
India	9	11	11	**13**
Kenya	14	13	5	**14**
Mozambique	14	5	13	**14**

Bangladesh	2	20	20	**16**
Lesotho	19	8	15	**16**
Nepal	13	14	16	**18**
China	9	16	21	**19**
Zambia	21	10	18	**20**
Guinea Bissau	14	21	17	**21**

Malawi tops the HRCI 2011 for developing countries. This reflects breadth of strength across themes. The top ranking is particularly salient because in the last year, donor support for Malawi has been partially withdrawn, due to a worsening political climate with growing lack of freedom.

Guatemala ranks second overall, performing strongly on the legal framework and policies and programmes themes, yet it does less well on agriculture, health and education spending.

Brazil, the overall number three, outperforms Malawi and Guatemala on two themes, but due to a low ranking on the government expenditure theme it did not top the HRCI. It is prudent to point out that had the HRCI been able to include social protection spending (which it could not for lack of comparable data), Brazil may have ranked higher on the government expenditures theme. The Brazilian government has strongly invested in social protection, notably through the Bolsa Familia programme.

The five worst performing countries in the HRCI are Guinea Bissau (21), Zambia (20), China (19), Nepal (18), Lesotho and Bangladesh (shared 16th).

Overall, we find strong fluctuations in countries' performance on the three themes. For instance, Tanzania has the best score on expenditures, but ranks 14th on policy. For Brazil, this situation was reversed. Inconsistent performance can have strong effects on overall ranking. For instance, Bangladesh performs less well than Zambia on the themes of policies and programmes and on government expenditures, yet its strong score on legal framework makes it outperform Zambia overall. China does fairly well on legal frameworks and expenditures, but its poor score on policies and programmes and on spending have substantial effect on its remarkably low overall ranking. Arguably, the legal framework theme is insufficiently able to differentiate countries, so the indicators would require further thought in future editions of the HRCI.

Overall rankings, while based on total Borda scores, do not tell the full story. Closeness of ranking does not necessarily mean that countries perform similarly. For instance, Mozambique and Bangladesh differ by 10 Borda 'points', but only by one place in the rankings (Mozambique is shared 14th, and Bangladesh 16th). Similarly, Malawi and Guatemala differ one rank, yet Malawi scored 9 'points' higher. In contrast, one rank difference for Guatemala and Brazil refers to a difference of only one Borda 'point'. Accordingly, we present overall rankings and total Borda scores in Table7.

Table 7: Overall Borda scores and HRCI ranking

Country	Overall Borda score	HRCI rank (1 is best)
Malawi	56	**1**
Guatemala	47	**2**

Brazil	46	**3**
Senegal	43	**4**
Ethiopia	42	**5**
Ghana	42	**5**
Tanzania	41	**7**
Gambia	40	**8**
Nigeria	37	**9**
Uganda	37	**9**
Burundi	37	**9**
Rwanda	37	**9**
India	35	**13**
Kenya	34	**14**
Mozambique	34	**14**
Bangladesh	24	**16**
Lesotho	24	**16**
Nepal	23	**18**
China	20	**19**
Zambia	17	**20**
Guinea Bissau	14	**21**

How do these findings compare with the ActionAid HungerFREE Scorecard 2010? Unlike the Scorecard, the HRCI does not include hunger outcomes. Table 8 suggests that this has a strong effect on rankings; countries with improved political commitment levels were weighed down by their hunger status; these include Senegal, the Gambia and Burundi (+11), Tanzania and Guatemala (+6), Ethiopia and India (+4), Malawi and Nigeria (+2), and Lesotho (+2). Conversely, countries whose hunger status improved, not least due to strong economic growth, are now shown not to have necessarily displayed strong political commitment. These countries include, most dramatically, China (-17), but also Bangladesh (-11) and Mozambique (-8). In some cases, like Ghana, Kenya and Lesotho the exclusion of hunger outcome indicators did not have major effects on overall performance.

Table 8: Comparison HRCI - HungerFree Scorecard 2010[12]

Country	HRCI	AA HungerFREE 2010	Difference in rankings
Malawi	**1**	3	+2
Guatemala	**2**	8	+6
Brazil	**3**	1	-2
Senegal	**4**	15	+11
Ethiopia	**5**	9	+4
Ghana	**5**	4	-1
Tanzania	**7**	13	+6

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[12] In order to allow for a comparison of the same set of countries, we removed Cambodia, Viet Nam, DR Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone and South Africa from the Scorecard (HRCI did not have data on these), and adjusted HungerFREE Scorecard rankings for the remaining set.

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Gambia	**8**	19	+11
Uganda	**9**	7	-2
Nigeria	**9**	11	+2
Burundi	**9**	20	+11
Rwanda	**9**	10	-1
India	**13**	17	+4
Kenya	**14**	14	0
Mozambique	**14**	6	-8
Bangladesh	**16**	5	-11
Lesotho	**16**	18	+2
Nepal	**18**	12	-6
China	**19**	2	-17
Zambia	**20**	16	-4
Guinea Bissau	**21**	n.a.	n.a.

In indices, "very poor countries invariably fare poorly in the rankings"..."However, these indices tell us nothing about how we should judge the performance of these countries, given the constraints they face" (Ravallion 2010, p.28, emphasis in original). Similarly, Brinkerhoff argues that one needs to understand indicators of political will in relation to contextual factors (Brinkerhoff 2000). For this reason, we tabulate calculated commitment scores against various context variables. Whilst for the purposes of analysing a country's political commitment we cannot conflate it with its hunger status, clearly commitment levels are not independent of the nature and extent of hunger and other contextual factors in the country, such as: (a) hunger, (b) the ability to do something about hunger and malnutrition and (c) political characteristics.

We thus present crosstabulations of commitment levels against such factors. In each case, we group commitment levels (low, medium, high) by simple reference to the upper, middle and lower third of countries' overall HRCI ranking (within sample). Countries with equal Borda scores were allocated to the same category (see Table 9).

Table 9: Summary of developing countries with low, medium and high commitment to reduce hunger

High	Borda Score	Medium	Borda Score	Low	Borda Score
Malawi	56	The Gambia	40	Bangladesh	24
Guatemala	47	Nigeria	37	Lesotho	24
Brazil	46	Uganda	37	Nepal	23
Senegal	43	Burundi	37	China	20
Ethiopia	42	Rwanda	37	Zambia	17
Ghana	42	India	35	Guinea Bissau	14
Tanzania	41	Kenya	34		
		Mozambique	34		

Table 10 presents political commitment levels as measured by the HRCI against the status of hunger, as expressed by the Global Hunger Index of IFPRI/Concern/Welthungerhilfe (2010

edition). It hence suggests that countries like Malawi, Guatemala, Senegal, Ethiopia and Tanzania (high commitment, high levels of hunger) may be fruitful contexts for donors to advocate and support hunger reduction efforts. Referencing this to the scores of countries on component indicators can further inform what kind of support may be given. Table 10 also suggests which countries demonstrate a low level of political commitment to reduce hunger, despite its population facing a serious or alarming hunger status (Guinea Bissau, Zambia, Bangladesh, Nepal and Lesotho).

Table 10: Hunger status and political commitment to reduce hunger

	HUNGER STATUS (GHI 2010)				
	Low	moderate	serious	alarming	Extremely alarming
COMMITMENT					
Low		China	Nepal	Guinea Bissau	
			Lesotho	Zambia	
				Bangladesh	
Medium			Kenya	India	Burundi
			Nigeria	Rwanda	
			Gambia	Mozambique	
			Uganda		
High	Brazil	Ghana	Malawi	Ethiopia	
			Guatemala	Tanzania	
			Senegal		

We can analyse a country's capacity to do something about hunger using two proxy variables: firstly, the available wealth (Gross National Income per capita), and secondly, the administrative capacity to act.

Table 11 suggests that greater wealth coincides with greater expression of political commitment to reduce hunger. This is not surprising; i.e. wealth makes public services, policies, and programmes possible. The more interesting finding is that the table also shows that low wealth need not be an impediment for the emergence and expression of political commitment to reduce hunger in legal frameworks, public expenditures and policies and programmes. Clearly, amongst a large group of low wealth countries, some express much stronger political commitment to reduce hunger than others. Hence, wealth does not appear to be a necessary condition for strong political commitment.

Table 11: Wealth and political commitment to reduce hunger

	WEALTH (GNI per capita, World Bank 2009)		
	Low	Low-mid	High-mid
COMMITMENT			
	Bangladesh	China	
	Guinea Bissau		

Low	Lesotho		
	Nepal		
	Zambia		
Medium	Gambia	India	
	Mozambique	Nigeria	
	Burundi		
	Kenya		
	Rwanda		
	Uganda		
High	Ethiopia	Guatemala	Brazil
	Malawi	Ghana	
	Tanzania	Senegal	

Next, we ask: is low political commitment to reduce hunger merely a consequence of government recognition that limited administrative capacity will impede the chances of successful and credible interventions? Here we employ the Government Effectiveness index scores; a component of the World Bank's World Governance Indicators that "captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies" (World Bank undated).

Table 12 demonstrates that several countries with low political commitment (and low wealth) actually have high administrative capacity to address hunger. This is particularly the case for Lesotho and China. Also in Zambia, lack of administrative capacity seems less of a problem than a lack of appropriate policies and programmes, legal frameworks, and expenditure levels. India and Senegal have medium wealth levels and high administrative capacities; here advocacy efforts that are able to raise awareness of the extent and nature of hunger and are able to produce appropriate policies and programmes, legal frameworks, and expenditure levels, have real potential to translate in effective hunger reduction. For other countries with high commitment, such as Malawi, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Guatemala, further strengthening of administrative capacity could be a fruitful direction for donor support. Ethiopia for instance has embarked on impressive decentralisation reforms, and this process may be further bolstered. In countries like Nigeria, Burundi, Kenya, the Gambia and Uganda, support may be directed towards enhancing administrative capacity, particularly if this prevents action against hunger from being undertaken.

Table 12: Administrative capacity and political commitment to reduce hunger

	ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY (WGI, World Bank 2009)		
	Low	Medium	High
COMMITMENT			
Low	Bangladesh	Zambia	Lesotho
	Nepal		China
	Guinea Bissau		
Medium	Burundi	Kenya	Mozambique

	Nigeria	Uganda	Rwanda
		Gambia	India
High		Ethiopia	Brazil
		Malawi	Senegal
		Guatemala	Ghana
		Tanzania	

The above two tables however also indicate the countries that perhaps have the longest road to travel, in terms of weak financial and administrative capacity to address high levels of hunger. These most notably concern Nepal, Bangladesh, and Guinea Bissau.

Finally, we analyse how political commitment rankings relate to the statuses of public accountability and voice in a country (Table 13). This was done in recognition of the fact that in open polities there is greater potential for citizens to hold governments to account, and for civil society groups to engage with governments in order to elevate hunger up political agendas. We accordingly crosstabulate political commitment against countries' scores on the public accountability and voice index (2010) annually collated by Freedom House.

Interestingly, Ethiopia shows high levels of political commitment to reduce hunger, despite having a weakly accountable political regime. Otherwise, higher levels of public accountability and voice seem to be positively related to higher levels of political commitment, with the exception of Nepal.

Table 13: Public accountability, voice and political commitment to reduce hunger

	PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND VOICE (Freedom House 2010)		
	Low	Medium	High
COMMITMENT			
Low		Nepal	
		China	
Medium	Rwanda	Nigeria	
		Kenya	
		Uganda	
High	Ethiopia	Malawi	Brazil
		Tanzania	Ghana
		Guatemala	

These crosstabulations allow us to re-embed political commitment scores within country contexts. They also offer some suggestions for donors on the direction in which they could support a country. Yet, they are unable to offer cut and dried recommendations. For instance, in the case of Ethiopia we note high hunger levels coinciding with high commitment to reduction: but it is not clear whether donors should focus on enhancing government capacity (medium), wealth (low), or voice (low).

Findings from expert perception surveys: Bangladesh and Zambia

The primary data derived from expert perception surveys in Zambia and Bangladesh have been organised under two themes -*government expenditures* and *policies and programmes*. We present responses summarising the scores given by the pool of experts[13] and present these by question, indicator and theme.

It is important to note that the same score may mean different things in different countries, so cross-country comparisons may not be valid. The next phase of the work will attempt to increase the validity of cross-country comparisons.

Public expenditures

The public expenditure theme involved five questions (Table 14).

Table 14: Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards hunger reduction (1 is best)

Question		Bangladesh	Zambia
		Mean	Mean
23	To what extent are government policy preferences (on hunger reduction) reflected in budget expenditures?	3.02	2.93
24a	How strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the government's absolute (in money terms) budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition	3.05	3.04
24b	How reasonable would you, in general, characterise the government's relative budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition (keeping in mind the nature of the problem, and local context)?	3.08	3.04
25a	How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition to electoral cycles?	2.4	1.92
25b	How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition to emergencies/disasters?	2.18	2.07
Indicator (mean of means)		2.75	2.60

NB: respondents scored countries on a range of 1-5. 1 indicates the highest level of commitment to hunger reduction

Overall, experts in both countries note a relatively mediocre performance of government performance in terms of their expenditures towards hunger reduction. They consider that key policy preferences regarding hunger reduction are reasonably reflected in the government budget expenditures. Moreover, the governments' absolute and relative expenditures on hunger reduction are assessed as passable. Interestingly, both countries do best in terms of the sensitivity of public expenditures to electoral cycles[14] and to hunger related emergencies.

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[13] The surveys were successful in covering experts from diverse organisational backgrounds, although a better balance between these will be aimed for in the future. For instance, in Bangladesh, there is some overrepresentation of the research sector, while this sector may need a boost in Zambia.

[14] Note that we interpreted sensitivity to electoral cycles as a good thing (signalling responsiveness to voter concerns) but one could argue that this responsiveness may also constitute a temporary, cynical attempt at manipulating voters. It is recommended to address this ambiguity in future editions of the HRCI.

Policies and programmes

The overall picture from the primary data is summarised in Table 15.

Table 15: Expert survey scores on indicators of commitment: Bangladesh, Zambia

Indicator	Bangladesh		Zambia	
	Mean score	Rank	Mean score	Rank
Institutional coordination	2.37	1	2.19	4
Government intention & action	2.34	2	2.01	3
Locus of initiative	2.42	3	1.79	1
Analytical rigour	2.50	4	1.94	2
Learning and adaptation	3.05	5	2.96	6
Public commitment	3.06	6	2.49	5
Mobilisation of stakeholders	3.11	7	3.00	8
Continuity of effort	3.32	8	2.99	7
Credible incentives	3.90	9	4.45	9
Overall score	2.91		2.65	

NB: respondents scored countries on a range of 1-5. 1 indicates the highest level of commitment to hunger reduction

Relative to other dimensions, both Bangladesh and Zambia score quite strongly in terms of institutional coordination. In fact, Bangladesh performs best on the indicator. Our expert assessment thus contrasts with discourses that emphasise the weak coordination of efforts to reduce hunger and malnutrition by various departments in charge of agriculture, social protection, health, nutrition, etc (Chopra, Pelletier et al. 2009; Engesveen, Nishida et al. 2009).

Both countries are judged to do well in terms of the locus of initiative--government bodies that initiate hunger reduction policy and programme initiatives are also put in charge of implementing these. Moreover, government intention and action aimed at hunger reduction, as well as the analytical rigour underlying them are evaluated as reasonably good.

Both countries have relatively poor scores were obtained for learning and adaptation; public commitment, the mobilisation of stakeholders, continuity of its efforts, and most notably, incentives for civil servants and government bodies to effectively combat hunger are seen to be weak. The contrast between control (the locus of initiative is strong) and incentives (weak) is something to pursue further.

Reflections on the process of conducting expert surveys

As part of the research, overseas partners responsible for implementing the expert surveys provided valuable feedback on their experience of the surveying process. The content of the questionnaires was generally considered clear. Some respondents suggested having separate questionnaires addressing hunger and malnutrition, and respondents recommended adding questions that enquire about specific government bodies such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Health and so on.

Interviewing experts involved a time consuming process, in terms of getting appointments organised and adhered to. Moreover, respondents felt that the questionnaire was too long. The piloted instrument required 30-45 minutes in Zambia, and over an hour in Bangladesh. Some respondents also expressed a preference for a distance based survey, e.g. through a web-based format.

In Zambia, despite assurances that answers would be treated with full confidentiality and would be anonymised respondents from the donor community and from civil society were sometimes uncomfortable answering questions on politics and operations of the Government. This may have resulted in non-responses and in 'safe' answers (i.e. answer category 3). This may be overcome in time. The surveying approach depends on the careful nurturing of trust between researchers and respondents, and this is a challenge particular to the early stages of establishing a pool of experts. To support this process, research findings will be shared with all respondents.

HRCI for Developed Countries

This section will first discuss the HRCI scores for developed countries, based on secondary data analysis. It will be followed by an analysis of our primary data from the expert perception surveys.

Table 16 presents the HRCI for the developed (donor) countries. Overall, Denmark tops the table, with Finland second and Belgium and Ireland sharing third position. Portugal lingers at the bottom of the table. Luxembourg tops the public expenditures rankings, but could not be scored on the policies and programmes theme, hence dropped out from overall rankings.

Table 16: Rankings by theme and overall HRCI rankings, developed countries

Country	Government expenditure rank	Policies and programmes rank	HRCI (1 is best)
Denmark	3	4	1
Finland	6	9	2
Belgium	9	7	3
Ireland	5	11	3
Norway	2	15	5
France	11	6	5
United Kingdom	14	3	5
Australia	16	2	8
Netherlands	10	8	8
Spain	4	14	8
Germany	12	10	11
South Korea	23	1	12
Japan	8	17	13
Canada	13	13	14
Greece	21	5	14
Sweden	7	19	14
Italy	22	12	17

United States of America	18	18	**18**
Austria	20	16	**18**
Switzerland	15	22	**20**
New Zealand	17	20	**20**
Portugal	19	21	**22**
Luxembourg	1	n.a.	**n.a.**

Table 17 presents the actual Borda scores instead of ranks and suggests five clusters of countries. The first cluster contains Denmark – in a league of its own. It stands at a very substantial distance (8-11 Borda 'points') from a second cluster comprising the countries ranked 2-9 (i.e. Finland, Belgium, Ireland, Norway, France, UK, Australia, the Netherlands and Spain), between which there is not much difference. A third cluster again is set apart by some distance (4 Borda 'points'). It is led by Germany, and includes South Korea, Japan, Canada, Greece and Sweden. A fourth group, again at quite some distance from the previous cluster, contains Italy, the USA, Austria, Switzerland and New Zealand. Finally, Portugal constitutes the fifth and bottom cluster.

Table 17: Developed countries HRCI: Borda ranks and scores – overall and by theme

Country	Government expenditure Borda score	Policies and programmes Borda score	HRCI Borda total score	**HRCI rank (1 is best)**
Denmark	21	20	41	**1**
Finland	18	15	33	**2**
Belgium	15	17	32	**3**
Ireland	19	13	32	**3**
Norway	22	9	31	**5**
France	13	18	31	**5**
United Kingdom	10	21	31	**5**
Australia	8	22	30	**8**
Netherlands	14	16	30	**8**
Spain	20	10	30	**8**
Germany	12	14	26	**11**
South Korea	1	23	24	**12**
Japan	16	7	23	**13**
Canada	11	11	22	**14**
Greece	3	19	22	**14**
Sweden	17	5	22	**14**
Italy	2	12	14	**17**
USA	6	6	12	**18**
Austria	4	8	12	**18**
Switzerland	9	2	11	**20**
New Zealand	7	4	11	**20**
Portugal	5	3	8	**22**

| Luxembourg | 23 | n.a. | n.a. | **n.a.** |

A comparison of HRCI rankings with Action Aid's HungerFREE Scorecard (2009)[15] produces some large differences (Table 18). They are the consequence of the HRCI's equal weighting scheme, the revision of indicators, and the use of a Borda ranking scheme.[16][17]

Compared to the Scorecard, the HRCI sees a higher ranking for several countries, with strong upward fluctuations. These notably concern: Australia (+8); Belgium (+7); Japan (+6); Canada (+4); Denmark (+3); France (+3); Spain and USA (+3); UK, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Germany and the US (+2); Ireland, New Zealand and Greece (+1).

Sweden (-10); Switzerland (-8); Austria (-6), Portugal (-6); Italy (-4) and Finland (-1) all moved downwards.

South Korea, a donor country ranked by the HRCI but not by the HungerFREE scorecard, comes in at a respectable mid-ranking.

Table 18: Comparison of rankings HRCI and HungerFREE Scorecard 2009

Country	**HRCI rank**	HungerFREE Scorecard **2009**	Difference
Denmark	**1**	4	+3
Finland	**2**	1	-1
Belgium	**3**	10	+7
Ireland	**3**	2	+1
Norway	**5**	3	+2
France	**5**	8	+3
United Kingdom	**5**	7	+2
Australia	**8**	16	+8
Netherlands	**8**	6	+2
Spain	**8**	10	+2
Germany	**11**	13	+2
South Korea	**12**	-	-
Japan	**13**	19	+6
Canada	**14**	18	+4
Greece	**14**	15	+1
Sweden	**14**	4	-10
Italy	**17**	13	-4
United States of America	**18**	20	+2
Austria	**18**	12	-6
Switzerland	**20**	8	-8

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[15] The HungerFREE Scorecard for 2010 does not calculate an overall index score; hence the comparison is made with its 2009 edition (Action Aid 2009).

[16] NB note that there was no removal of hunger outcomes, unlike for the developing countries HRCI

[17] Luxembourg ranked top of the HungerFREE Scorecard 2009 but HRCI did not have data for it so we re-ranked the HungerFREE data.

New Zealand	**20**	21	+1
Portugal	**22**	16	-6

Findings from expert perception surveys: UK

As for Bangladesh and Zambia, results are presented by perceptions on expenditure and then by the quality of policies and programmes. Scores were calculated by question (as a mean score over all respondents)[18] and across all questions under an indicator (as a mean of means).

Public Expenditures

As Table 19 shows, the experts in our pool were critical of the UK aid budgets for combating hunger giving low scores, (4=weak).

Table 19: Expert perceptions on UK aid expenditures on hunger

Question		Mean
28	To what extent are UK aid policy preferences (re: hunger and malnutrition reduction) reflected in budget expenditures?	3.94
29a	How strong or weak would you characterise UK aid expenditures on hunger and malnutrition, in (a) absolute (in money terms)?	4.18
29b	How strong or weak would you characterise UK aid expenditures on hunger and malnutrition, in (b) relative terms (keeping in mind the nature of the problem and relative to other aid spending)?	4.41
30a	How sensitive are UK aid budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition to emergencies?	3.94
Mean score		**4.12**

Policies and Programmes and Legal Framework

For the indicators regarding the policies and programmes and legal framework themes, Table 20 shows the varied performance of the UK government, based on the questions asked for each of the 10 indicators.

Table 20: Expert survey scores on indicators of commitment: UK

Indicator	Mean score	Rank
Analytical rigour	1.72	1
Government intention and action	2.23	2
Locus of initiative	2.86	3
Institutional coordination	2.87	4
Learning and adaptation	3.00	5
Public commitment	3.09	6
Mobilisation of stakeholders	3.26	7
Continuity of effort	3.36	8
Credible incentives	3.43	9

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[18] Question 30b could not be included in the calculation

Coherence domestic – aid policy	3.92	10
Overall score	2.97	

The pool of experts considered that UK aid efforts are clearly underpinned by a strong degree of analytical rigour – on this indicator the UK scores best. Moreover, the UK government's general intention and action towards hunger reduction in developing countries is seen as relatively strong.

The experts considered that DFID country offices have reasonable flexibility to initiate and adjust headquarter strategies and programmes to suit local contexts. This enhances the likelihood that decentralised offices in charge of programmes are committed to make these succeed. The UK government is seen to do reasonably well on the indicator 'locus of initiative'. Similarly, the UK is seen to make fairly good efforts towards institutional coordination of bi and multilateral efforts to reduce hunger in the developing world.

Weaker scores were given in terms of the UK's responsiveness to learning and adaptation; in terms of its public commitment and openness about policy preferences; and its mobilisation of various stakeholders to strengthen buy in and enhance programmatic success and longevity.

Experts were not convinced that UK government sufficiently institutionalised incentives that reward and sanction individuals and bodies like DFID for their performance in hunger reduction.

Finally, the lowest score was given to the UK Government's efforts to coordinate domestic and international aid policies and programmes in the fight against hunger. In this regard, we may want to further expand future primary data collection for donor countries beyond their aid programmes.

Sensitivity analysis for the HRCI

We tested the robustness of the HRCI, by comparing it with three alternative ways of constructing the index. This involves comparing ranking patterns of countries between our HRCI and three versions:

- One that uses an additive rather than a Borda ranking scheme
- One that uses percentages for normalisation as opposed to re-scaling variables to score between zero and one, with the formula [xi-min(x)]/[max(x)-min(x)] using observed maxima and minima as per the HDI methodology (García Aguña and Kovacevic 2011))
- One that weights indicators using weights derived from Principal Components Analysis (as opposed to equal weights)

The rankings of HRCI with these three alternate rankings are then compared and summarised using Spearman rank correlation coefficients which assess the degree of correspondence between rankings. Table 21 summarises the findings.

Table 21: Summary of sensitivity analysis HRCI developed countries

	Developing countries	Developed countries
	Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient	Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient

Additive ranking	0.99	0.86
Normalised to %	0.91	0.75
Principal Components	0.74	0.70

The sensitivity analyses show that the HRCI is robust for developing and developed countries.[19]

When employing alternative ranking and normalisation procedures, for developing countries, we find Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients that are close to one across the various components and that are always significantly different from zero at less than 1%. Moreover, these different choices in index construction did not substantively alter the rankings of individual countries. The developed country rankings are slightly more sensitive to choices, but again, without dramatic changes in rankings. The full findings are listed in the background technical report.

For both sets of countries, the rankings seem most sensitive to decisions around weights, specifically by means of a Principal Components analysis. Nevertheless, even in this case the HRCI is robust for both developing and developed countries.

The potential of the HRCI for advocacy

This section reflects on the potential of the HRCI for advocacy which is a key part of the HRCI's theory of change. An HRCI workshop, hosted by ActionAid in July 2011, brought together both national and international NGO and civil society actors from a range of organisations to:

- discuss how the draft Hunger Reduction Commitment Index could be improved and developed--particularly from an advocacy perspective
- explore its role in relation to existing indices and learn from their experience of using indices to influence national and international policy processes
- examine how HRCI can strengthen civil society mobilisation and coordinated action both at global and country level
- share information and opportunities for disseminating the Index including existing campaigns and advocacy priorities
- discuss the possible engagement of a broader group of NGOs in the development of an advocacy and communication strategy for the project

Case studies were presented on the application of the IFPRI/Concern Global Hunger Index and ActionAid HungerFREE Scorecard as advocacy tools and lessons shared on participant's experience of campaigns and initiatives using indices to address hunger issues. In particular we sought input from country partners in Bangladesh and Zambia to provide a country level analysis of the potential and limitations that the project might face. A SWOT analysis exercise also drew out some of the key strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats identified by participants.[20]

In order to enhance the advocacy potential of the HRCI a priority in moving forward will be to build the level of engagement with the HRCI among national and global experts, civil society and communities and wider stakeholders in the Index countries. The project is well placed to do this for a number of reasons:

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[19] Note that the technical background report also includes sensitivity analyses of the HungerFREE Scorecard.
[20] A full workshop report, including results of this analysis and next steps, is included in Appendix 5

- The project partners are already engaged across a broad spectrum of academic, civil society and policy networks and fora globally and at country level.
- The methodological focus on primary data collection provides good opportunities to engage with key actors and stakeholders at an early stage in the process.
- The cross-sectoral nature of the indices facilitates broad engagement which may help to bring together the different sectors which are required to influence action against hunger.
- The innovative approach taken by HRCI can create new opportunities to influence governments, open dialogue with donor countries and highlight gaps in current knowledge and data availability.

A number of opportunities to improve the advocacy potential of the project were identified:

- Community level engagement with the index building process (See Appendix 1 on Community Voices) should be a higher priority for the next phase of the project. Being able to identify grassroots/community level priorities for government action would strengthen the advocacy potential of HRCI. Not doing so presents the risk that the HRCI is not accountable to grassroots organisations
- Building effective national civil society and government use of the Indices will require facilitating access to the underlying data and providing analytical assistance in translating what it means in particular contexts. Providing such technical support provides another opportunity to deepen engagement with key stakeholders
- Constructing the index has highlighted a number of gaps in the availability of data linking political commitment to hunger and malnutrition. Where these are apparent we should use the project to lobby for better and more comprehensive data collection
- The project partners must effectively communicate how the indices link to the global policy processes (e.g. MDGs) and engage with them in a timely way. We will need to clearly articulate how the HRCI is distinct from other Indices such as the Global Hunger Index.

The use of primary data in constructing the indices is one of the key innovations and strengths of the HRCI project. However it also presents one of the key challenges as it is both time consuming (which could affect the timeliness and relevance of the index as an advocacy tool) and resource intensive. We will need to carefully balance these factors in designing the scaled-up primary data collection process in phase 2.

Dissemination/outreach activities

If the HRCI is to add value by highlighting success and deficits in commitment to ending hunger, it has to be known about and easy to access. The first phase has begun to set up mechanisms for such outreach.

Website: The HRCI website (hrcindex.org) was launched to coincide with the publication of the draft index for consultation in July 2011and has been regularly updated since to provide updates on the project and to provide access to relevant background papers, presentations and the latest data. Users interested in the project can subscribe to receive updates.

Through the website we have also experimented with a number of data visualisation applications to explore innovative ways of presenting the indices which allowed users to interact with and explore the underlying data (see http://hrcindex.org/category/data/).

Events: Two events were organised to present initial findings from the project. The first was an IDS lunchtime seminar which presented the draft index to an academic audience and invited feedback on the methodological approach, indicators and index construction. The second event was the 1 day workshop hosted at the ActionAid office in London which focused more on the advocacy potential of the indices. A full workshop report from this event was produced and has been shared with workshop participants. It is included in Appendix 5.

Other outputs: A number of background documents and reports have been shared during the course of the project and can be accessed via the project website (http://hrcindex.org/category/background-documents/). In addition the project had been covered as a news item on the IDS website…Who is committing to reduce hunger? A new tool for tracking political commitments, 28 July 2011[21] and it has been featured in the Development Horizons blog (C*an the "commitment" to reduce hunger be measured? Should it?, 18 July 2011[22]*).

Conclusions

This report has developed a Hunger Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) for a set of developing and developed countries, using secondary data. In addition, for the UK, Bangladesh and Zambia, primary data were collected from expert panels on additional dimensions of hunger reduction commitment to get a more nuanced and actionable country-specific scorecard of effort.

The theory of change of the HCRI is that (a) it will measure commitment credibly and this will strengthen our ability to hold Governments and donors to account for their efforts in reducing hunger, (b) if civil society is better able to hold Governments and donors to account in terms of their effort to reduce hunger, then it can apply pressure and ensure that hunger is not neglected and keep it higher on the development agenda, (c) Governments and donors can use the HRCI to help track and prioritise their efforts, (d) commitment can be linked to outcomes, to allow all to assess the 'value added' of different commitments and efforts and (e) vitally, the process of assessing commitment can be a way of building awareness and commitment of civil society and Governments to reduce hunger.

For developing countries we constructed the HRCI around 3 themes: legal frameworks, policies and programmes and government expenditures. In each theme we selected 3 indicators which we normalised so we could combine them without worrying about units of measurement. We ranked each theme and then ranked the sum of the 3 ranks. Unlike the ActionAid HungerFree index, we did not conflate hunger reduction commitment and hunger outcomes. For the developed countries we constructed the data around 2 themes--spending and a combined theme of legal environment and policies and programmes--with 5 indicators in each.

For all countries, the HRCI was constructed to draw on data from a number of sectors to tell us about government efforts to improve the components of food security: food availability, access and utilisation. Commitment itself was conceptualised as government action (as opposed to intent) in these areas around the legal and policy environments and for public expenditures.

For the developing countries Malawi, Guatemala, Brazil, Senegal and Ethiopia headed the HRCI list, with Lesotho, Nepal, China, Zambia (20th) and Guinea Bissau coming bottom. Compared to

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[21] http://www.ids.ac.uk/news/who-is-committing-to-reduce-hunger-a-new-tool-for-tracking-political-commitments
[22] http://www.developmenthorizons.com/2011/07/can-commitment-to-reduce-hunger-be.html

the HungerFree index, the biggest rank change was for China (down 17 places). When China's outstanding hunger outcome reductions are taken out of the HRCI, its hunger-specific commitment score is shown to be low. This result demonstrates the importance of contextualising commitment by the extent of the hunger problem. Clearly a lower commitment is more compatible with (and may be driven) by a smaller hunger problem.

For both sets of countries rankings were not found to be unduly sensitive to our choices about weighting and ranking methods.

Cross-tabulation of the developing country HRCI scores with hunger, wealth, administrative capacity and voice and accountability scores, highlighted several off- diagonal situations: high hunger and low commitment (notably Guinea Bissau, Zambia, Bangladesh, but also Nepal and Lesotho), low wealth and high commitment (e.g. Malawi, Ethiopia, and Tanzania), high administrative capacity and low commitment (e.g. Lesotho and China) and low public accountability and voice but high commitment (Ethiopia). This contextualisation makes the HRCI more than an index, but helps it play a diagnostic role, guiding action from different stakeholders (governments, civil society, donors) to where their efforts can make the biggest difference.

For the developing countries, the primary data highlighted the problem of incentives for both Zambia and Bangladesh--the feeling from the expert panels was that there were few consequences or rewards for action against hunger. Interestingly the area where Zambia did best was in ensuring that bodies that initiate policies and programmes to reduce hunger are also made responsible for, and thus have good ownership of their implementation. Clarity on responsibility however does not seem sufficient to incentivise performance. Bangladesh did best in terms of ensuring a good level of institutional coordination of policies and programmes run by various government bodies to address hunger.

For the developed or donor countries, Denmark is the top ranked HRCI country with Finland (2), Ireland (3) and Belgium (3) following. Switzerland, New Zealand and Portugal were the worst ranked. Compared to the HungerFree ranks, Australia and Belgium were the biggest gainers in the HRCI with Sweden and Switzerland being the biggest fallers. This is the consequence of using equal weights of various indicators and themes in the HRCI.

Primary data were collected for the UK. In general the expert panel felt that DFID employed a great deal of analytical rigour in developing aid policy on hunger, but that it was found wanting on its ability to mobilise stakeholders, its continuity of effort, credible incentives offered by it, and its ability to get anti-hunger commitment coherence across different government departments and policies.

The primary data for all 3 countries give us a glimpse of how they can be used to diagnose where additional government effort needs to be directed over time in developing stronger commitments for hunger reduction. The primary data cannot yet be used to compare across countries and this is something to be developed in the next phase of the work. As the consultation process at ActionAid suggested, the absence of community voice data is a real gap to address in the next phase of work—to get an additional "expert" perspective on government performance, but perhaps more crucially to get ownership of the HRCI process to make the tool more valuable for advocacy.

The aim of the HRCI is to stimulate greater commitment to reduce hunger and therefore to accelerate hunger reduction. A number of initial outreach activities have been undertaken, most

notably the establishment of a website which will allow users to construct their own indices by making different choices from the ones we made.

But the next phase of the work really begin to build on this initial investment and it aims to (a) present this work in a number of venues to get feedback on technical issues and on how to make the HRCI more useful, (b) causally link the HRCI to hunger outcomes using econometric methods to see if the HRCI has the potential to accelerate hunger reduction in a ex-post context, (c) construct an HRCI using the next available year of secondary data, comparing data across years, (d) collecting primary data for more than 3 countries, and finding a way to benchmark the data to allow for cross-country comparisons so it can be incorporated into the HRCI, (e) support country specific anti-hunger programmes and advocacy campaigns through common and country specific combinations of secondary and primary data, and (f) the setting up an ex-ante evaluation of the HRCI's ability to accelerate hunger reduction efforts.

Appendix 1: Community Voices

Community voices: complementing the HRCI

The HRCI draws significantly on expert perspectives on political commitment. These may be valuably complemented by community perspectives, drawing on individual and collective accounts of (limitations of) government actions to reduce hunger and malnutrition. While sensitive to context, 'community voices' may complement current primary data collection by:

- informing the choice of indicators;
- interpreting index scores
- identifying opportunities for community involvement in advocacy campaigns.

Below we give some examples of what community perspectives on political commitment to reduce hunger may look like, drawing on recent IDS field research in rural and urban Zambia and Bangladesh on the impacts of the global food, fuel and financial crisis. Here, respondents were asked their experiences of government action, to address topics like food prices; social protection programmes; and agricultural input programmes.

Food Prices

For a number of the participants surveyed in Zambia the government was given some credit for taking action on high food prices. However, although staple food and fuel prices had dropped sharply in January 2009, people felt that the government had not done enough to respond to the crisis (IDS 2010). In Bangladesh, respondents showed substantial appreciation of government efforts to make subsidised rice and other food items accessible during the peak of the food crisis, and this continues to be important. Yet women complained that the subsidised rice was of poor quality, requiring them to cook each meal fresh rather than once daily, requiring more unaffordable fuel and time and effort on their part. As rice prices rose, the subsidy meant a considerable saving but at substantial additional costs to women's time and labour (IDS 2010).

Social protection programmes

In the two areas surveyed in Bangladesh, social protection programmes were acknowledged to be offer important support to poor people facing hunger, yet widespread concerns were expressed about effective access. People felt that allowances and entitlements were mainly going to those with good connections to local government representatives in rural areas. One woman said of her attempt to get onto the pilot '100 Days' public works programme:

> 'I went and begged at the feet of the council member, telling him I have no husband, please give me work, but he wouldn't give me work. First he said, you are a woman, you won't be able to do it. But I said, I only eat by working. Even then he didn't give it to me.' (IDS 2009)

In the Zambian towns of Chikwanda and Kabwata, people benefited little from government social protection or development programmes. In 2010, Kabwata informal traders knew of, but felt excluded from, the new Citizens' Economic Empowerment Fund: their view was that they were either unqualified to benefit, or it was too procedurally complex to apply for (IDS 2010).

<u>Agricultural inputs</u>

The Government that came in power in Bangladesh in January 2009 extended fertilizer subsidies after a significant hike in fertilizer prices. Research found that these were having a positive impact on agricultural production and the wider rural economy in 2010. Indeed most occupation groups in the rural and urban communities surveyed reported that livelihoods had improved over the previous twelve months as a consequence (IDS 2010).

In contrast, in rural Zambia the government's seed and fertilizer support programme was perceived to be generally ineffective by farmers in the survey locale, as fertilizer was often sent too late, towards the end of the planting season. Furthermore, although this programme is supposed to help the most vulnerable, it is actually richer farmers who benefit most from the scheme, as the poorest farmers cannot contribute 50% of the cost of fertilizer (RuralNet Associates Limited 2010). Moreover, farmers felt that the Zambian governments' new Farmers' Input Support Programme (FISP), which was intended to sharpen the focus on food security by doubling the number of beneficiaries to over 500,000 each year, was insufficient to positively affect production levels and food security. Farmers noted that the expansion had been achieved by halving the amount of fertilizer available to each beneficiary household and limited the amount of maize seed available (IDS 2010).

Appendix 2: Tables with interview questions related to indicators of political commitment (primary data)

For developing countries (Zambia, Bangladesh), the questions underpinning these indicators are summarised below.

Overview of questions in developing country expert survey, by indicator

Indicator	Questions
Institutional coordination	Q26. As hunger and malnutrition is typically an issue of relevance to multiple ministries and governmental agencies, could you inform whether the government has appointed a coordinating body that promotes joined up thinking/action?[23] Q27. If yes, how successful is this body in delivering a coordinated approach to hunger and malnutrition reduction?
Government intention and action	Q2. In your opinion, what kind of a priority action does your government give to hunger and malnutrition? Q6A. For the key government policies you identified in question 5... How important does the government consider these? Q6B. For the key government policies you identified in question 5, how sufficient are current government efforts towards fulfilling policy goals? Q30. In your opinion, generally, how good is the implementation of public policies (re: hunger and malnutrition)?
Locus of initiative	Q5A. Could you name those policies that the government considers most relevant and currently undertakes to reduce hunger and malnutrition (name up to 5 - refer to those listed in table above)? For each, can you tell to what extent was this policy initiated by the agency responsible for executing it?
Analytical rigour	Q17. How important is scientific evidence in hunger and malnutrition policymaking processes in the country? Q18. How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and evidence (e.g. Monitoring & Evaluation; Research & Development) for policy?
Public commitment	Q16. How clearly are public policy preferences aiming to address hunger and malnutrition set out in government documents? Q21. How accessible is government policy (aiming to address hunger and malnutrition reduction) to public scrutiny (by citizens, civil society, media, etc)?
Learning and adaptation	Q19. In general, how likely are government policies to be adjusted (e.g. to objectives, instruments, strategies and funding) when strong evidence piles up that suggests a change of course? Q20. To what extent does the government innovate and experiment with new policy approaches developed domestically or abroad to combat hunger and malnutrition?
Mobilisation of stakeholders	Q7. In your opinion, how well do agencies[24] responsible for a) designing and b) implementing these policies build broad-based social and political support in order to ensure their success and longevity? Q10. In your opinion, how successful do agencies in charge of/implementing key policies muster adequate and ongoing support to overcome resistance from stakeholders whose interests are threatened? Q11. In your opinion, what levels of support do government efforts towards hunger reduction and

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[23] This is the only question in the survey having a yes/no answer category. We attributed a value of 1 in case of yes, and 5 in case of no.
[24] Agencies designing policy refer to government bodies. The question on implementation can consider non-government bodies,

	malnutrition receive from a) the public; b) civil society; c) political opposition; d) the civil service; e) international donors and f) the private sector?
Continuity of effort	Q31. In your opinion, to what extent does the government enhance a) administrative capacity and b) financial capacity at 1) national and 2) sub-national levels to effectively address hunger reduction and malnutrition in the country? Q32. In your opinion, to what extent does the government utilise existing a) administrative capacity and b) financial capacity at 1) national and 2) sub-national levels to effectively address hunger reduction and malnutrition in the country?
Credible incentives	Q28. For the government *agency/agencies* in charge of a) designing and b) implementing hunger and malnutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned (e.g. through budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas; gain/loss of respect, etc)? Q29. Similarly, for *individuals* within the government agencies in charge of a) designing and b) implementing hunger and malnutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned (e.g. through promotions, training opportunities; budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)?

For developed countries (UK), the questions underpinning these indicators are summarised below.

Overview of questions in expert survey developed countries, by indicator

Indicator	Questions
Institutional coordination	Q34. Hunger and malnutrition is typically an issue of relevance to multiple donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral). What level of intellectual leadership does UK aid demonstrate in a) multilateral forums and b) within a recipient country, with other donors? Q35. What level of practical leadership does UK aid demonstrate in a) multilateral forums and b) bilaterally within recipient countries (e.g. by chairing donor coordinating bodies)?
government intention and action	Q7. What kind of a priority does the UK aid programme give to hunger and malnutrition? Q8. How does current attention to the theme of hunger and malnutrition in the UK aid programme compare to this one year ago? Q12. For those hunger and malnutrition reduction interventions identified as most important in UK aid, how sufficient are current efforts towards fulfilling policy goals? Q13. To what extent do UK aid officials speak out against hunger and malnutrition in: a) International public forums; b) Recipient country public forums and c) Recipient country private forums (with political, civil service and civil society leaders)
Locus of initiative	Q15. To what extent do DFID (UK Department for International Development) in-country offices enjoy flexibility to create hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes sensitive to country specific circumstances?
Analytical rigour	Q16. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and b) in-country offices have of the status of hunger and malnutrition in recipient countries? Q17. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and b) in- country offices have of causal factors of hunger and malnutrition? Q18. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and b) in-country offices have of potential solutions for hunger and malnutrition? Q19. How important is scientific evidence in UK aid programmes on hunger and malnutrition reduction? Q20. How developed are UK aid systems (e.g. Monitoring & Evaluation, Research and Development) for generating knowledge and evidence for policy?
Public commitment	Q26. How clearly are policy preferences aiming to address hunger and malnutrition (in the developing world) set out in UK government publications?

	Q27. How open is UK government policy (aiming to address hunger and malnutrition reduction) to public scrutiny (by citizens, civil society, media, etc)?
Learning and adaptation	Q21. In general, how likely are UK aid programmes and policies to be adjusted (e.g. to objectives, instruments, strategies and funding), when faced with strong evidence that suggests a change of course? Q22. To what extent does UK aid innovate and experiment with new policy approaches developed domestically or abroad to combat hunger and malnutrition? Q23. What level of importance do UK aid programmes give to informing and influencing hunger and malnutrition relevant policies in recipient countries?
mobilisation of stakeholders	Q24. How successfully do UK aid programmes muster adequate and ongoing support for its hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes in recipient countries? Q25. How would you evaluate UK government communication efforts towards domestic audiences to build and retain support for overseas hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes?
continuity of effort	Q33. Is the UK aid programme on hunger and malnutrition best characterised as: a) Entirely long term, programme oriented; b) Chiefly long term, programme oriented; c) Mixture of long and short term, programme and project; d) Chiefly short term, project focused; or e) Entirely short term, project focused
Credible incentives	Q31. For DFID as an agency, is the (lack of) achievement of hunger and malnutrition policy objectives credibly sanctioned or rewarded (eg through promotions, training opportunities, budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)? Q32. For DFID (individual) staff, is the (lack of) achievement of hunger and malnutrition policy objectives credibly sanctioned or rewarded (eg through promotions, training opportunities, budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)?
Coherence domestic policy – aid policy	Q36. To what extent do UK achievements to reduce CO_2 emissions and efforts mitigating climate change cohere with the objectives of UK aid towards hunger and malnutrition reduction overseas? Q37. To what extent do UK domestic agricultural subsidy policies cohere with UK aid policy objectives regarding hunger and malnutrition reduction in developing countries? Q38. To what extent does the UK position in international trade negotiations (or the position it takes to influence EU trade policy) cohere with UK aid policy objectives regarding hunger and malnutrition reduction?

Appendix 3: Developing countries: pool of experts questionnaire
Hunger and Malnutrition Reduction

Interview Schedule[25]

Brief introduction

This project aims to understand (changes in) the ways in which national governments in a range of countries make efforts to address hunger and malnutrition. It develops an index that summarises intentions and actions, and attempts to assess these over time.

This interview schedule comprises one part of the index (other parts include desk based research on institutional and legal environments, financial allocations, etc).

The structured interview schedule invites a *national pool of experts* to share their insights on the ways in which governments engage with hunger and malnutrition issues. Currently in its incipient stages, the interview schedule is first piloted in Bangladesh and Zambia. If successful, similar efforts will be made in a range of other developing countries. More so, the exercise is envisaged to be repeated in these countries in years to come in order to develop a temporal perspective.

Confidentiality/anonymity

All discussion between interviewer and interviewee will be done on the basis of **full confidentiality**. This means that:

- All information resulting from the discussion will be **treated as confidential**;
- **Anonymisation** procedures will be applied to ensure that findings cannot be traced to individual respondents;
- Interview findings will be combined with findings from interviews with fellow experts – accordingly, **no interview data will be presented as standalone findings**;
- At any moment, respondents have the **right to withdraw** co-operation or retract information given.

HUNGER REDUCTION COMMITMENT INDEX Phase 1 Final report 2011

General information of respondent

Date of interview:

Day	Month	Year

Name of interviewer:
First and last name.

Name of respondent:
First and last name.

Place and country of residence:

Gender:

Female	Male

Educational background:
Highest education level

Organisation/Institution the respondent is working for:

Position held in the organisation:

Type of organisation:

Main area of expertise:
Circle those that apply

1. Health
2. Nutrition
3. Agriculture
4. Food Policy
5. Education
6. Social Policy
7. Other (please state)

Q1. In your opinion, how important are hunger and malnutrition problems in the country?

1   Highly critical
2   Important
3   Somewhat important
4   Of limited importance
5   Unimportant
6   Refuse to answer
99   don't know

Q2. In your opinion, what kind of a priority does your government give to hunger and malnutrition?

1. Very high priority
2. High priority
3. Moderate priority
4. Low priority
5. Very low priority
6. Refuse to answer
   99. Don't know

Q3. In its efforts to address hunger and malnutrition, which groups does the government prioritise (e.g. children, OVCs, landless people)?

Q4. In your opinion, what is the relevance of the following policies for addressing hunger and malnutrition in your country?

POLICIES	1 Highly relevant 2 Relevant 3 Somewhat relevant 4 Weakly relevant 5 Irrelevant 6 Refuse to answer 99 Don't know
Industrialisation	
Investment in Infrastructure	
Promoting Agricultural Growth	
Trade support for domestic producers	
Land reform	
Improving credit access	
Price support	
Market Service Provision eg price information	
Livestock Policies	
Livelihoods Diversification Schemes	
Developing and promoting new technologies	
Input subsidies	
Established constitutional/ legal Right to Food	
Reducing risk: early warning and response	
Exclusive breastfeeding support and promotion up to 6 months	
Complementary feeding – from 6months to 2 years of age	
Food fortification/ Micronutrient supplementation	
Education on nutrition and hygiene practices	
Maternal health/ nutrition – supplementation, ante-natal care	
Improve female literacy rates	
Female empowerment	
School Feeding Programmes/ Free school meals	
Employment schemes	
Food Aid	
Subsidised food rations/ vouchers/ community kitchens	
(Un)Conditional Cash Transfers	
Old age social pension	
Minimum Wage	
OTHER I	
OTHER II	
OTHER III	
OTHER IV	

NB: ALL QUESTIONS REFER TO NATIONAL POLICIES AIMING TO REDUCE HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION

Government policies

Q5. Could you name those policies that the government considers critical and currently undertakes to reduce hunger and malnutrition (name up to 5 - refer to those listed in table above)? For each,

A. Can you tell whether it was initiated by the agency responsible for the overview of its implementation?

B. If not, can you identify which agency initiated the policy?

5. Name of policy	5A. To what extent was this policy initiated by the agency responsible for executing it?	5B. If not fully or mostly, what other agency drove this policy?*
	1. Fully 2. Mostly 3. Somewhat 4. Hardly 5. Not at all 6. Refuse to answer 99. Don't know	
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

* (e.g.consider agencies within/outside government, inc. donors)

Q6. For the policies you mentioned in question X, could we ask you a few more questions:

A. How important does the government consider this policy?

B. How sufficient are government efforts towards fulfilling policy goals?

6. Name of policy	6A. How important does the government consider this policy? 1. Very important 2. Important 3. So-so 4. Unimportant 5. Very unimportant	6B. How adequate are government efforts towards fulfilling policy goals? 1. Very sufficient 2. Somewhat sufficient 3. So-so 4. Somewhat insufficient 5. Very insufficient
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Stakeholders

Q7. In your opinion, how well do agencies responsible for designing/implementing these policies build broad-based social and political support in order to ensure their success and longevity?
1. Very strongly
2. Strongly
3. So-so
4. Weakly
5. Very weakly
6. Don't know
99. Refuse to answer

Q8. In your opinion, how likely are flagship policies (identified in question Q5 above) to challenge powerful entrenched interests?
1. Very likely
2. Likely
3. Somewhat likely
4. not likely
5. not at all likely
6. don't know
99. refuse to answer

Q9. In your opinion, how well do policy strategies and decisionmaking bodies allow the representation of divergent interests, including those of opposing stakeholders?
1. Very strongly
2. Strongly
3. So-so
4. Weakly
5. Very weakly
6. Don't know
99. Refuse to answer

Q10. In your opinion, how successful do agencies in charge of/implementing key policies muster adequate and ongoing support to overcome resistance from stakeholders whose interests are threatened?
1. Very successful
2. Successful
3. Somewhat successful
4. Not very successful
5. Not at all successful
6. Don't know
99. Refuse to answer

Q11. In your opinion, what levels of support do government efforts towards hunger reduction and malnutrition receive from (interviewer: circle response for each category):

	Very strong	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Very weak	Don't know	Refuse to answer

The public	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
Civil society	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
Political opposition	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
Civil Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
International donors	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
Private sector	1	2	3	4	5	6	99

Q12. In your opinion, how influential are the following actors in the formulation of hunger and malnutrition reduction policies in the country (at national level)?

	Very influential	Influential	Moderately influential	Weakly influential	Not influential at all	Don't know	Refuse to answer
Civil society	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
Political opposition	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
Civil Service	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
Multilateral donors	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
Bilateral donors							
Private sector	1	2	3	4	5	6	99

Q13. In your opinion, how strongly do a) multilateral and b) bilateral donors operating in your country advocate hunger and malnutrition reduction?

	a) Multilateral donors	b) Bilateral donors
1 very strongly		
2 strongly		
3 so-so		
4 weakly		
5 very weakly		
6 refuse to answer		
99 don't know		

Leadership

Q14. In your opinion, to what extent do *senior* political leaders, civil society representatives and civil servants leaders speak out publicly against hunger and malnutrition?

Political leaders	Civil society	Civil servants

    1   very strongly
    2   strongly
    3   so-so
    4   weakly
    5   very weakly
    6   refuse to answer
    99 don't know

Q15. In your opinion, how credible are public statements made by *senior* a) politicians; b) civil society representatives and c) civil servants' public statements in relation to hunger reduction and malnutrition?

Political leaders	Civil society	Civil servants

    1   highly credible
    2   credible
    3   so-so
    4   not very credible
    5   highly incredible
    6   refuse to answer
    99 don't know

Analysis, learning and adaptation

Q16. How clearly are public policy preferences aiming to address hunger and malnutrition set out in government documents?
1. Very clearly;
2. Clearly;
3. Somewhat
4. Unclearly
5. Very unclearly
6. Refuse to answer
    99 don't know

Q17. How important is scientific evidence in hunger and malnutrition policymaking processes in the country?

1. Very important
2. Important
3. So-so

4. Unimportant
5. Very unimportant
6. Refuse to answer
99 Don't know

Q18. How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and evidence (e.g. Monitoring & Evaluation; Research & Development) for policy?
   1. Strongly developed
   2. Developed
   3. Somewhat
   4. poorly developed
   5. non existent
   6. Refuse to answer
   99. Don't know

Q19. How likely are government policies to be adjusted (e.g. to objectives, instruments, strategies and funding) when faced with strong new evidence that suggests a change of course?
   1. Very likely
   2. Likely
   3. Somewhat likely
   4. Not very likely
   5. Very unlikely
   6. Refuse to answer
   99. Don't know

Q20. To what extent does the government innovate and experiment with new policy approaches developed domestically or abroad to combat hunger and malnutrition?
   1   Very strongly
   2   Strongly
   3   Somewhat
   4   Weakly
   5   Very weakly
   6   Refuse to answer
   99 Don't know

Q21. How open is government policy (aiming to address hunger and malnutrition reduction) to public scrutiny (by citizens, civil society, media, etc)?
   1. Fully open
   2. Open
   3. Somewhat open
   4. Not very open
   5. Not at all open
   6. Refuse to answer
   99 don't know

Q22. In your opinion, what level of empirical understanding do *senior* a) politicians; b) civil society representatives; and c) civil servants have of the
      a) status of hunger and malnutrition in the country
      b) causal factors and

c) potential solutions?

	Status	Causal factors	Potential solutions
Senior politicians			
Senior civil servants			
Civil society leaders			

1. Very high
2. High
3. Moderate
4. Weak
5. Very weak
6. Refuse to answer
   99. don't know

Budgets

Q23. To what extent are government policy preferences reflected in budget expenditures?
1   very strongly
2   strongly
3   so-so
4   weakly
5   very weakly
6   refuse to answer
99 don't know

Q24. In your opinion, how strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the government's absolute (in money terms) and relative budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition?

	Absolute expenditures	Relative (compared to other social policy areas)
1 Very strong		
2 Strong		
3 So-so		
4 Weak		
5 Very weak		
6 Refuse to answer		
99 Don't know		

Q25. In your opinion, how sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition to a) electoral cycles; b) emergencies/disasters?

	a) Electoral cycles	b) Emergencies/disasters
1 very strongly		
2 strongly		
3 so-so		
4 weakly		
5 very weakly		
Don't know		
Refuse to answer		

Institutional incentives

Q26. As hunger and malnutrition is typically an issue of relevance to multiple ministries and agencies, could you inform whether the government has appointed a coordinating body that promotes joined up thinking/action?
1. Yes
2. No (→ skip next question)

Q27. If yes, how successful is this body in delivering a coordinated approach to hunger and malnutrition reduction?
1. Very successful
2. Successful
3. Moderately successful
4. Not very successful
5. Unsuccessful
6. Refuse to answer
99 Don't know

Q28. For the government agency/agencies in charge of a) designing and b) implementing hunger and malnutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned (e.g. through budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas; gain/loss of respect, etc)?

	Policy design agencies	Implementing agencies
1. Always		
2. Mostly		
3. Sometimes		
4. Occasionally		
5. Never		
6. Don't know		
99. Refuse to answer		

Q29. Similarly, for *individuals* within the government agencies in charge of a) designing and b) implementing hunger and malnutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned (e.g. through promotions, training opportunities; budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)?

	Policy designers	Policy implementers
1. Always		
2. Mostly		
3. Sometimes		
4.Occasionally		
5.Never		
6.Don't know		
99. Refuse to answer		

Q30. In your opinion, generally, how good is the implementation of public policies (re: hunger and malnutrition)?

- 1   Very good
- 2   Quite good
- 3   Moderately good
- 4   Quite poorly
- 5   Very poorly
- 6   Refuse to answer
- 99   Don't know

Q31. In your opinion, to what extent does the government enhance a) administrative capacity and b) financial capacity at 1) national and 2) sub-national levels to effectively address hunger reduction and malnutrition in the country?

	a) Administrative capacity		b) Financial capacity	
	1. National level	2. Sub-national level	1. National level	2. Sub-national level
1 very strongly				
2 strongly				
3 so-so				
4 weakly				
5 very weakly				
6 refuse to answer				
7 don't know				

Q32. In your opinion what are the two biggest constraints to more effective government action against malnutrition and hunger?

1.

2.

Finally

Are there any other comments or feedback that you would like to share?

_____

_____

_____

_____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION!

Appendix 4: Developed country pool of experts questionnaire (Web-based format applied to the UK)

Objective:
This survey is designed to gauge expert perceptions of the level of political commitment that developed countries demonstrate towards combating hunger and malnutrition in the developing world.

Its findings are used to construct an index.

Instructions for respondents:
Respondents are requested to take an overall perspective, to evaluate the general features and performance of a given country's aid programme towards hunger and malnutrition reduction in the developing world.

All questions in this survey refer to the aid efforts of the UK government. Future surveys will cover other G20 countries.

Respondent selection:
Respondents are selected on the basis of their understanding of the development industry, and particularly of aid donors' efforts towards hunger and malnutrition reduction.

Outcomes:
Findings are planned to be reported in JulyAugust 2011.

Please provide us with some details about yourself. This information will be held confidentially by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and not shared with any external parties. Survey findings will be presented in an aggregated manner only.

1. Name
2. Email address
3. Sex/gender
4. Area of expertise

5. Organisation type
- Academic
- Bilateral aid agency
- Commercial/Business
- Government
- Health
- International NGO or CSO
- Library/Information Service
- Media
- Multilateral Aid Agency
- National/Local NGO or CSO
- Network
- Political party
- School/College
- No affiliation
- Other (please specify)

6. Would you like to be informed about the findings of this project?
Yes/No

7. What kind of a priority does the UK aid programme give to hunger and malnutrition?

- Very high priority
- High priority
- Moderate priority
- Low priority
- Very low priority
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

8. How does current attention to the theme of hunger and malnutrition in the UK aid programme compare to this one year ago?

- Attention is much stronger
- Attention is stronger
- Attention is the same
- Attention is weaker
- Attention is much weaker
- Do not know
- Refrain to answer

9. Which types of hunger and malnutrition relevant programmes in the field of Agriculture would be most likely supported by UK aid? Select the two most likely programmes.

- Raising agricultural production
- Land reforms
- Introducing new agricultural technologies
- Gender equitable land ownership
- Do not know

10. Which types of hunger and malnutrition relevant programmes in the field of Nutrition would be most likely supported by UK aid? Select the two most likely Programmes

- Micronutrient supplementation
- Breastfeeding awareness raising
- Secure breastfeeding opportunities in workplace
- Food fortification
- Do not know

11. Which types of hunger and malnutrition relevant programmes in the field of Social Protection would be most likely supported by UK aid? Select the two most likely programmes.

- Food Aid
- Promote a citizen's right to food
- Cash Transfers
- Birth registration/identification cards
- Do not know

12. For those hunger and malnutrition reduction interventions identified as most important in UK aid, how sufficient are current efforts towards fulfilling policy goals?

- Very sufficient
- Somewhat sufficient
- So so
- Somewhat insufficient
- Very insufficient
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

13. To what extent do UK aid officials speak out against hunger and malnutrition in a) International public forums b) Recipient country public forums c) Recipient country private forums (with political, civil service and civil society leaders)

- Very strongly
- Strongly
- Soso
- Weakly
- Very weakly
- Don't know

14. What level of technical expertise exists within UK aid programmes on a) sustainable livelihood, b) nutrition and c) agricultural development?

- Very high
- High
- Moderate
- Low
- Very low
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

15. To what extent do DFID (UK Department for International Development) in-country offices enjoy flexibility to create hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes sensitive to country specific circumstances?

- Very high extent
- High extent
- Moderate extent
- Low extent
- Very low extent
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

16. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and b) in country offices have of the status of hunger and malnutrition in recipient countries?

- Very high
- High
- Moderate
- Weak

- Very weak
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

17. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and
b) in country offices have of causal factors of hunger and malnutrition?

- Very high
- High
- Moderate
- Weak
- Very weak
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

18. What level of empirical understanding do UK aid officials at a) headquarters, and
b) in country offices have of potential solutions for hunger and malnutrition?

- Very high
- High
- Moderate
- Weak
- Very weak
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

19. How important is scientific evidence in UK aid programmes on hunger and malnutrition reduction?

- Very important
- Important
- Soso
- Unimportant
- Very important
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

20. How developed are UK aid systems (e.g. Monitoring & Evaluation, Research and Development) for
generating knowledge and evidence for policy?

- Strongly developed
- Developed
- Somewhat
- Poorly developed
- Nonexistent
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

21. In general, how likely are UK aid programmes and policies to be adjusted (e.g. to objectives,
instruments, strategies and funding), when faced with strong evidence that suggests a change of course?

- Very likely
- Likely
- Somewhat likely
- Not very likely

- Very unlikely
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

22. To what extent does UK aid innovate and experiment with new policy approaches developed domestically or abroad to combat hunger and malnutrition?

- Very strongly
- Strongly
- Somewhat
- Weakly
- Very weakly
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

23. What level of importance do UK aid programmes give to informing and influencing hunger and malnutrition relevant policies in recipient countries?

- Very high
- High
- Moderate
- Low
- Very low
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

24. How successfully do UK aid programmes muster adequate and ongoing support for its hunger and malnutrition reduction programmes in recipient countries?

- Very successfully
- Successfully
- Somewhat successfully
- Not very successfully
- Not at all successfully
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

25. How would you evaluate UK government communication efforts towards domestic audiences to build and retain support for overseas hunger and malnutrition eduction programmes?

- Very strong
- Strong
- So so
- Quite weak
- Very weak
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

26. How clearly are policy preferences aiming to address hunger and malnutrition (in the developing world) set out in UK government publications?

- Very clearly
- Clearly

- Somewhat clearly
- Unclearly
- Very Unclearly
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

27. How open is UK government policy (aiming to address hunger and malnutrition reduction) to public scrutiny (by citizens, civil society, media, etc)?

- Fully open
- Open
- Somewhat open
- Not very open
- Not at all open
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

28. To what extent are UK aid policy preferences (re: hunger and malnutrition reduction) reflected in budget expenditures?

- Very strong
- Strong
- So so
- Weak
- Very weak
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

29. How strong or weak would you characterise UK aid expenditures on hunger and malnutrition, in absolute (in money terms) and relative terms (keeping in mind the nature of the problem and relative to other aid spending)? a) Absolute expenditures b) Relative expenditures

- Very strong
- Strong
- So so
- Weak
- Very weak
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

30. How sensitive are UK aid budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition to emergencies/disasters?

- Very sensitive
- Sensitive
- So so
- Not very sensitive
- Insensitive
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

31. For DFID as an agency, is the (lack of) achievement of hunger and malnutrition policy objectives credibly sanctioned or rewarded (eg through promotions, training opportunities, budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)?

- Always
- Mostly
- Sometimes
- Rather occasionally
- Never
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

32. For DFID (individual) staff, is the (lack of) achievement of hunger and malnutrition policy objectives credibly sanctioned or rewarded (eg through promotions, training opportunities, budget rises/cuts; win/loss of political gravitas, etc)?

- Always
- Mostly
- Sometimes
- Rather occasionally
- Never
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

33. Is the UK aid programme on hunger and malnutrition best characterised as:

- Entirely long term, programme oriented
- Chiefly long term, programme oriented
- Mixture of long and short term, programme and project
- Chiefly short term, project focused
- Entirely short term, project focused
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

34. Hunger and malnutrition is typically an issue of relevance to multiple donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral). What level of intellectual leadership does UK aid demonstrate in a) multilateral forums and b) within a recipient country, with other donors?

- Very strong
- Strong
- So so
- Weak
- Very weak
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

35. What level of practical leadership does UK aid demonstrate in a) multilateral forums and b) bilaterally within recipient countries (eg by chairing donor coordinating bodies)?

- Very strong
- Strong
- So so
- Weak
- Very weak
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

36. To what extent do UK achievements to reduce CO2 emissions and efforts mitigating climate change cohere with the objectives of UK aid towards hunger and malnutrition reduction overseas?

- Very high level of coherence
- High level of coherence
- Moderate level of coherence
- Low level of coherence
- Very low level of coherence
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

37. To what extent do UK domestic agricultural subsidy policies cohere with UK aid policy objectives regarding hunger and malnutrition reduction in developing countries?

- Very high level of coherence
- High level of coherence
- Moderate level of coherence
- Low level of coherence
- Very low level of coherence
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

38. To what extent does the UK position in international trade negotiations (or the position it takes to influence EU trade policy) cohere with UK aid policy objectives regarding hunger and malnutrition reduction?

- Very high level of coherence
- High level of coherence
- Moderate level of coherence
- Low level of coherence
- Very low level of coherence
- Don't know
- Refrain to answer

39. Please insert any comments that you may wish to share.

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.

Appendix 5: Report on HRCI Workshop

Hunger Reduction Commitment Index Planning Workshop Report

11am – 3.30pm Monday 18th July 2011
ActionAid, 33-39 Bowling Green Lane, London, EC1R 0BJ

Convened by the Institute of Development Studies, Action Aid, Save the Children and Trócaire. Facilitated by Carl Jackson, Westhill Knowledge Group.

The workshop presented the 'Hunger Reduction Commitment Index' (HRCI) project which aims to measure the political commitment of donor and recipient governments to addressing hunger and malnutrition.

More information on the project, including presentations from the workshop, can be found on the HRCI website at: hrcindex.org

 The key objectives of the workshop were:

- To discuss how the Hunger Reduction Commitment Index can be improved and developed into a valuable advocacy resource and its role in relation to existing indices
- To initiate a productive discussion on how it can strengthen civil society mobilisation and coordinated action both at global and country level
- To share information and opportunities for disseminating the Index including existing agencies' campaigns and advocacy priorities
- To discuss the possible engagement of a broader group of NGOs in the development of an advocacy and communication strategy

The workshop was opened by Lawrence Haddad of IDS who introduced the origins of the HRCI project and described how it was inspired by ActionAid's HungerFREE scorecard and other attempts to measure political commitment. He proposed a theory of change for the project:

- Hunger is neglected, numbers of hungry are not decreasing, pressures are likely to increase in future
- Outcome based measures do not promote strong enough accountability
- Civil society needs something to hold governments to account their commitment
- Governments need mechanisms to focus their cross-department efforts on hunger
- The building of commitment can be helped by measuring the current level of commitment and promoting the uptake of measures to improve it:
  - o Across countries for global advocacy (using secondary data)
  - o Within countries for national advocacy (using primary data)

Advocacy Case Studies
Lessons were shared on the IFPRI/Concern Global Hunger Index and ActionAid HungerFREE Scorecard to set a context for, and inform, the discussion on the advocacy potential for the HRCI.

Olive Towey of Concern introduced the Global Hunger Index (GHI), a composite index with three indicators:

- o proportion of undernourished in population
- o child under-nutrition (under 5 yrs);
- o child mortality rate (under 5 yrs)

Index rankings are presented alongside an annual theme, case studies and analysis. The index attracts global media coverage and has informed roundtable discussions and debates in a number of global and country forums including in the Irish parliament and the UN MDG Summit. Its impact is difficult to measure but it is seen as contributing to a wider advocacy agenda around hunger issues.

Kim Trathen (ActionAid) and Afeef Ahmed (ActionAid Bangladesh) shared experiences from their involvement with the ActionAid HungerFREE Scorecard. The HungerFREE Scorecard is more campaign focused than the GHI – supporting ActionAid's national Hunger Free campaigns. It combines outcome indicators with measures of political commitment.

The speakers described how the Scorecard was used in two country case studies, from Brazil and Sierra Leone, and described some of the challenges of locating useful and meaningful data. Selecting indicators for which comprehensive data coverage was available, and for which data was comparable year-on-year, had proved particularly difficult.

Introducing the Hunger Reduction Commitment Indices
Dolf te Lintelo and Jennifer Leavy described the innovative combination of both primary and secondary data to assess political commitment to hunger and malnutrition. They presented preliminary findings from the pilot surveys carried out in Bangladesh and Zambia and an initial index calculated for 21 countries using secondary data indicators. The data in the index was cross-tabulated against a number of contextual variables including wealth, administrative capacity, hunger status and accountability.

The presentation can be accessed at:
http://hrcindex.wordpress.com/2011/07/17/18th-july-workshop-presentation/

Workshop participants gave detailed feedback on the presentation which is not included in full here but some key areas of the discussion are highlighted below.

A number of participants highlighted the need to include community voices alongside the expert surveys and quantitative measures. They felt that qualitative assessment to identify grassroots/community level priorities for government action would make the approach taken more innovative and enhance the value of the index as an advocacy tool.

The issue of "ownership" of the index among national and global experts, civil society and communities was a strong theme throughout the discussions. All these groups were felt to be important for the credibility of the index and engagement with, and contributions from, civil society was also highlighted as important to ensure their support.

Several participants also highlighted the potential for the project to highlight gaps in the availability of comprehensive data linking political commitment and hunger and malnutrition. There was some discussion of the relative merits of using a smaller or larger number of indicators to produce the index. One the one hand a clear and easy to understand index, using fewer indicators, was felt to provide a good political tool to exert pressure on governments whilst the use of more detailed data at the country level would allow for a more nuanced analysis of a particular context which might lead to a more useful engagement in policy processes.

The Index as an Advocacy Tool
In the afternoon participants shared their experience of campaigns and initiatives using indices to address hunger. They also looked into how the HRCI project could support civil society mobilisation and coordinated action both at the global and country level.

The discussion highlighted some areas of risk around the need to ensure that the HRCI complemented existing advocacy activities, particularly at the country level.

Indices which rank countries performance where generally seen to be useful advocacy tools and participants felt that HRCI could be useful in this context provided it had a clear strategy, a distinct narrative and could clearly communicate how it links to the broader policy context.

A SWOT analysis exercise drew out some of the key strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats identified by participants. These were then ranked to help the project team prioritise action for the next phase.

Strengths of the HRCI (in order of ranking – highest ranked first)
The HRCI methodology is innovative
It is the only index to measure political commitment and so occupies a useful new niche in the wider context of advocacy activities around hunger. The mix of primary and secondary data is key. In particular the collection of primary data from experts is new and presents a useful opportunity to engage with policy audiences. IDS involvement in developing the index gives some assurance of technical and research rigour which will underpin any substantive findings. The robust approach lends itself to lobbying but can also be used to help policy makers identify areas that need attention and are priorities for action.

Government Accountability
The index highlights the political nature of hunger focusing on national processes and potentially providing a good accountability mechanism and opportunity to form alliances and engage with partners, Southern NGOs and communities. Developed as well as developing countries should be included.

Weaknesses of HRCI (in order of ranking – highest ranked first)
Community voice
There has been no community engagement with the index building process to date. This presents the risk that the HRCI is not accountable to grassroots organisations.

Data
Primary data collection and community participation is time and resource intensive so it may be difficult to sustain. It is still unclear how to effectively combine primary and secondary data and the list of indicators is open to criticism both for what it includes and what it leaves out. The challenges of obtaining data limit the indicator choices.

Methodology
The HRCI methodology must balance a number of complex and competing factors: Credibility, data availability, scope, level of generalisation/disaggregation.

Opportunities for the HRCI (in order of ranking – highest ranked first)
Forming Alliances
The HRCI approach is cross-sectoral which may help to bring together different sectors which can influence action against hunger (e.g. nutrition and food security / agriculture and civil society actors; CDS, FAO, WFP, IFPRI and national statistics offices) and link into other advocacy initiatives. The collection of primary research data from communities and experts in itself presents an opportunity to build alliances.

Advocacy
The HRCI should create new opportunities to influence governments, open dialogue with donor countries and highlight gaps in current knowledge and data availability. To be successful in this regard it will need to be communicated clearly, link to policy context (e.g. MDGs) and solutions.

Threats to the HRCI (in order of ranking – highest ranked first)
Overlap with other Indices
Even if it is not duplicating other indices, outcomes could get lost in the clamour for attention between 'rival' initiatives which already exist. Furthermore there is potential to contradict other indices and dilute their impact. If not communicated appropriately, when compared to other indices it may be perceived as too academic and not relevant to the policy context.

Resourcing
The methodological dependence on primary research is a threat given the resource implications and project management needed to carry it out. A review of the primary data collection approach to ensure sustainability is suggested. The time taken to produce primary data might impact the relevance of the index by the time it is ready for publication.

Politics
Political sensitivities may hamper data collection particularly in more repressive country contexts. There is also a danger of dissonance between national level advocacy and a 'new index' if local civil society and advocacy groups are not proactively engaged in its production.

Action points and decisions on next steps

- Participating organisations were asked to express interest in contributing to the project in a number of ways:

    - IDS invited participants to assist in peer-reviewing the Phase 1 report and / or contributing to a section on next steps drawing on the SWOT analysis (report due end August 2011). They also invited organisations interested in collaborating on the proposal for the next phase of the project to get in touch.

    - Partners to assist in the in primary data collection are being sought for the next phase.

Of the organisations present:
- Concern are keen to remain engaged in the project. They would like time to reflect on discussions and consult with country teams and will then be able to respond about the level of interest in the HRCI going forward.

- Save the Children are excited about the advocacy benefits of the HRCI, especially how to link it to country advocacy. They would be prepared to help write sections of the Phase 1 report and collaborate in Phase 2 proposal writing.
- ActionAid would welcome additional partners joining the HRCI project - especially NGOs, other research organisations and WFP / FAO. They need to see how the HRCI will link with their campaigning strategy from 2013. They are prepared to collaborate in Phase 2 proposal writing.
- IDS is fully on board to provide technical support to the index, writing the Phase 1 report and Phase 2 proposal, helping to evaluate the impact of the HRCI and making the data meaningfully accessible at country level through knowledge services and capacity development work.
- Trocaire have found the HRCI valuable in validating existing work and will find it useful for Southern advocacy and for critiquing the seeming consensus in the North by pointing to the need to look at coherence between agencies. They would be keen to support Phase 2 developments.

Organisations who were unable to attend will be approached to give them an opportunity to engage (Oxfam and One were mentioned specifically).

The HRCI project website will be kept up to date with developments and email updates sent when new material is posted.

Workshop participants

Afeef Ahmed	ActionAid Bangladesh
Alan Stanley	Institute of Development Studies
Alex Wijeratna	Consultant policy researcher, ActionAid International
Carl Jackson	Westhill Knowledge Group
Daphne Jayasinghe	Save the Children
Delphine Valette	Save the Children
Dolf te Lintelo	Institute of Development Studies
Elena Gonzalez	Action Against Hunger
James Birch	All Party Parliamentary Group on Food and Agriculture
Jennifer Leavy	Institute of Development Studies
Jennifer Thompson	Concern Ireland (Also representing Irish Food Security Working Group)
Kim Trathen	ActionAid
Lawrence Haddad	Institute of Development Studies
Mary Brady	Irish Aid
Michael O'Brien	Trocaire
Natalie Duck	Concern Worldwide
Olive Moore	Trocaire
Olive Towey	Concern Worldwide
Olivia Wills	Africa Small Farmers Group
Ruchi Tripathi	ActionAid
Shahidur Rahman	Coordinator International Food Security Network,
Sophie Murray	International Food Security Network
Youjin B. Chung	Action Aid

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